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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this Dissertation is to philosophically critique 
three approaches to explicating the nature of moral judgments. 1 The 
three approaches are formalism, the content approach (brands of conse-
quentialism, for instance) and virtue ethics, and then to develop a 
philosophically defensible model of moral judgment making using input 
from various ethical views discussed in the Dissertation. In reviewing 
the literature, including Dissertation Abstracts, there was not a single 
work found which dealt with the precise issue of this Dissertation. 
There are a number of works which consider single aspects of the 
issue of the nature of moral judgments -- or which elucidate a particu-
lar approach to the issue. But no single work was found which philo-
sophically explicated and analyzed the positions of formalism, the 
content approach and virtue ethics collectively -- not to mention a work 
which attempts to develop an "integrated model" of moral judgment mak-
ing, which will be the focus of Chapter Five. 
1The term 11 moral 11 is being used because many of the writers we 
will be examining use 11 moral 11 rather than 11 ethical. 11 We will be using 
the terms 11 moral 11 and "ethical" interchangeably -- fully realizing the 
philosophical difficulties in such a move. 
1 
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Regarding Hare's brand of formalism, it will be argued that his 
notion of prescriptivity as one characteristic of a moral judgment is 
philosophically problematic. For instance, merely because an utterance 
is prescriptive it does not follow that one is capable of fulfilling 
it. 2 Commands obviously have many purposes and to reduce them to one 
type, prescriptive, is philosophical reductionism at its worst. 
The best that Hare could argue, then, is that SOME value judgments 
entail imperatives. Imperatives may guide conduct, but not choice. By 
insisting that imperatives guide moral choices Hare fails to make a 
fundamental and necessary distinction, namely that between choice and 
conduct. 
There are also philosophical difficulties with Hare's contention 
that universalizability is a second characteristic of a moral judgment. 
Universalizability does not separate moral judgments from other norma-
tive judgments, for instance. Universalizability could be a character-
istic of aesthetic judgments, say. There is no basis for distinguishing 
a moral judgment from other judgments simply by positing the universal-
izability characteristic for which Hare argues. 
Lawrence Kohlberg is a formalist because he likewise uses univer-
salizability as one defining characteristic of a moral judgment. 3 
2 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1963), p. 51. 
3Kohlberg 1 s position is found in various articles in his Essays on 
Moral Develo ment: Vol. 1, The Philoso h of Moral Develo ment. (New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1981 . 
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The same criticisms of Hare's attempt at this move apply to Kohlberg. 
But Kohlberg goes beyond Hare in that Kohlberg sees no place for habit 
as an aspect of moral judgment making. Not that Hare does. It is 
merely the case that Kohlberg's theory is a mixture of a formalist and a 
content theory. But, as will be argued in some depth, Kohlberg's model 
of habit is quite behavioristic and certainly not within the philosophi-
cal tradition. William Frankena and John Dewey have a more philosophi-
cally appropriate concept of habit -- so it will be argued. 4 
It has been a philosophical commonplace that motivation is inte-
gral to moral judgment making. And "affect" is one aspect of the moral 
judgment-making process. Kohlberg, with his highly rationalistic, 
cognitive approach to moral judgment making, makes little attempt to 
integrate these various processes in moral judgment making and, thus, 
his theory of moral judgment making is deficient for this reason alone. 
Finally, like Plato before him, Kohlberg argues that there is an 
essential connection between knowledge and virtue, that is, if one knows 
the moral thing to do, she will do it. 5 We will take Kohlberg to task 
regarding this aspect of his theory. 
4see, William K. Frankena, Three Historical Philoso hies of Edu-
cation. (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1965 and John 
Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics. (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1891). 
5Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of 
the Platonic View, 11 Moral Education: Five Lectures, Ed. T.Sizer. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
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The content approach will be represented by Kurt Baier and Stephen 
Toulmin. Baier argues that it is "the moral point of view" which is the 
defining characteristic of a moral judgment -- in fact, "the moral point 
of view11 determines if a moral judgment is true or false. 6 One can 
always retort, though, that following "the moral point of view" becomes 
problematic when following it violates one's self-interest. One won-
ders, then, if "the moral point of view" is a point of view which is 
ACTUALLY held by anyone at all or if it is really the case that all 
Baier is saying is that "the moral point of view11 is a view which OUGHT 
to be actually held. 
Stephen Toulmin, on the other hand, argues that 11 good reasons 11 
supply the content aspect of moral judgments. 7 But, similar to Baier, 
Toulmin never lets the reader know if "good reasons" are justifications 
for saying 11 X is a proper moral judgment11 or "X ought to be done. 11 Yet, 
Toulmin is more of a consequentialist than Baier. 8 In fact, for moral 
judgments which are not unequivocal (promise keeping, for example), it 
is the consequences which define 11 X being a proper moral judgment. 11 And 
the basic consequence Toulmin argues for is 11 community harmonization. 119 
6Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1958). 
7stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1950). 
8Ibid., p. 134. 
9Ibid., p. 133 and p. 136. 
5 
But for such an argument to be sound Toulmin would need to show that the 
principle that community harmonization is THE basic morally acceptable 
consequence of moral judgment making is itself a part of the community's 
moral code. But it can't be, for to be so Toulmin would be begging the 
question. For these reasons, among others, the content approach to 
defining the characteristics of moral judgments is wanting. 
Perhaps, though, the virtue ethics approach will fare better. Ac-
cording to Macintyre it is the "narrative unity of a human life" which 
is the criterion of a 11 true 11 moral judgment. 10 But one's life could be 
unified by such a narrative and the person still be a lost soul. Like-
wise, many people, such as Hitler, lived a life in which his narrative 
unity seemed to be accomplished. We disagree, of course, about how that 
unity was apparently accomplished. 
James Wallace also uses the criterion of community harmonization 
as a basic defining characteristic of moral judgment making. 11 But, as 
we shall argue, what he has in mind as representing that community har-
monization is strictly following social convention. And certainly 
following social convention sometimes may not be the moral thing to do. 
For these reasons, among others, virtue ethics has philosophical prob-
lems of its own which militate against it being THE candidate for 
explaining the nature of moral judgments. 
lOAlasdair Macintyre, After Virtue. (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 203. 
11James Wallace, Virtues and Vices. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1978), p. 33. 
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What will be attempted, then, based upon the work of Tom 
Beauchamp, 12 will be to develop an "integrative model" of moral judgment 
making which uses elements from the three theories philosophically exam-
ined in this Dissertation, among others. The rationale for such a move 
will be explicated and such a model proposed, supplied with philosophi-
cal justification. At times, then, universalizability (a formalist 
criterion) might be a proper criterion for defining a moral judgment, 
while at other times an examination of the proposed consequences (a 
content aspect) might do the job. 
The Dissertation will be divided into the following chapters: 
Chapter One: The Problem 
This chapter has presently set the problem in philosophical perspective. 
There has been an attempt here to also review the important literature, 
and to develop the modus operandi for the rest of the Dissertation. 
Chapter Two: The Fonnalist Approach 
This chapter will explicate, examine and philosophically analyze the 
work of R. M. Hare and Lawrence Kohlberg -- with a view toward demon-
strating philosophical difficulties with their respective positions. 
Chapter Three: The Content Approach 
This chapter will examine and philosophically critique the theories of 
Kurt Baier and Stephen Toulmin regarding their content approaches to 
12Tom Beauchamp develops his concept of "integration" in several 
places. Perhaps his most systematic attempt is in "What's So Special 
About the Virtues?", Virtue and Medicine: Ex lorations in the Character 
of Medicine, ed. Earl Shelp Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1985 , 
pp. 307-327. 
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adequate criteria of moral judgment making. Some comparisons and con-
trasts will be made with the formalist approach. 
Chapter Four: The Virtue Ethics Approach 
This chapter will likewise explicate and philosophically examine the 
theories of the proper criteria of moral judgment making of Alasdair 
Macintyre and James Wallace -- with Philippa Foot and Bernard Williams 
as the basis for contrasting theories. 
Chapter Five: Models of Moral Judgment Making 
This chapter will take elements from the three approaches previously 
examined, among other insights regarding the nature of moral judgments, 
and attempt to develop a more "integrated model" of moral judgment 
making -- a model which is philosophically argued for. The work of Tom 
Beauchamp will serve as a basis for this model. 
Chapter Six: Su111T1ary and Conclusion 
With this agenda in mind, then, let us begin our philosophical 
trek through the wilderness of moral judgments, that is, let us begin to 
examine theories regarding the characteristics and criteria which are 
thought to make a judgment moral. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FORMALIST APPROACH 
Philosophers do not agree regarding the characterization of moral 
judgments. But in the main they seem content to agree that moral judg-
ments are an outcome of normative inquiry. Indeed it would be odd to 
suggest otherwise. The problem is not with someone who asserts that a 
moral judgment is a form of non-normative inquiry. At this point the 
issue is definitional (i.e., the philosophical tradition has defined 
moral judgments as a form of normative inquiry). The issue is peculiar-
ly philosophical, that is, a psychologist might consider moral judgments 
to be a form of non-normative inquiry -- of objective, scientific in-
quiry, perhaps. The crux of the argumentation for the philosopher, 
though, is to develop criteria for an activity to be characterized as 
normative inquiry. One way to do this is to make certain sorts of dis-
tinctions. 
Moral judgments are thought to be responding to questions about 
what should be done, what should be preferred, and so on, 
from what is the case or can be done or must happen. 
kinds of questions are indicative of the broad scope 
as distinct 
The following 
of normative 
inquiry: How does one know when one is using a specifically moral 
8 
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argument or that a dilemma facing one is a moral dilemma? How does one 
identify someone else's claims as being moral? What is it that enables 
sociologists or anthropologists to recognize certain practices and 
judgments of individuals who live in different cultural contexts and 
situations as moral? For better or worse, these are the sorts of ethi-
cal issues which are inherent in the normative umbrella. 
One such characterization of the nature of moral judgment is 
termed 11 formalism 11 and the argument which will be developed in this 
chapter will be that formalism begs foundational questions, because the 
very criteria which formalism poses as 11 forms 11 which characterize a 
moral judgment from other types of judgments (universalizability and 
prescriptiveness) do not do the job. These characteristics do not 
distinguish moral judgments from aesthetic judgments, for example. 
Some philosophers do respond to the question "What distinguishes 
moral judgments from other judgments?" or "What makes a judgment moral?" 
by arguing (or assuming?) that there must be certain essential features 
common to all instances of morality. A recent exponent of a purely for-
mal account is R. M. Hare. 13 But in expounding and analyzing Hare's 
ethical views, we need to be clear about what exactly it is we are 
expounding and analyzing. The concern to date has been with moral judg-
ments. Hare, though, gives moral rules logical precedence over moral 
13Hare's ethical theories are consistently developed in two books: 
The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), and 
Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
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judgments. We need to be cautious that we are expounding and analyzing 
arguments relating to the same area of concern. 
In saying that Hare's concern is with moral rules is not to change 
the game. Hare's claim that moral rules have precedence over moral 
judgments is not tantamount to saying that Hare's formal characteristics 
are devoid of reference to moral judgment. It is, after all, moral 
judgment which this study restricts itself to. 
Hare's point is that moral judgments ENTAIL moral rules (impera-
tives). We can only make the judgment that X ought not to be done if we 
are committed to the rule that "All X's of a similar kind ought to be 
forbidden. 1114 (The quotation marks are mine.) If one asks Hare where 
such imperatives have their source, he would be forced to reply that the 
source is derived from a standard or principle we assume, accept or com-
mit ourselves to. 
Hare, then, could not reply that the source of our moral judgment 
is self-evident. To do so would mean that the source would have con-
tent. This is what Hare denies. He says: 
To become morally adult ... is to learn to use 'ought' sentences 
in the realization that they can only be verified by reference to a 
standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision 
accepted and made our own.15 
14R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 10. 
15R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 77-78. 
11 
In The Language of Morals, Hare has not related the characteris-
tics which entitle a judgment to be called moral to the issue of 
sources, that is, what forms the basis for or is the foundation for 
saying 11 X ought to be done. 11 In The Language of Mora 1 s, Ha re goes so 
far as to admit: 
.•. if an enquirer still goes on asking 'But why should I live 
like that?' then there is no further answer to give him ... We can 
only ask him to make up his mind which way he ought to live; for in 
the end everything rests on such a decision of principle.16 
There is something amiss, then, in The Language of Morals. If Hare were 
to insist that the source of a moral judgment is the same as that which 
legitimizes it, he would be begging the question. To avoid this he 
sharply distinguishes between a moral rule and the formal characteris-
tics of moral judgments (universalizability and prescriptiveness). The 
latter constitutes a logical thesis for Hare, while the former consti-
tutes a foundational thesis. The two must not be confused. 
Yet at some point he needs to integrate the logical thesis and the 
foundational thesis. Otherwise his foundational thesis is suspect of 
arbitrariness. Hare accomplishes this integration in Freedom and Reason 
where he interrelates the twofold character of moral judgments (pre-
scripscriptivity and universalizability). He writes: 
When we are trying, in a concrete case, to decide what we ought to 
do, what we are looking for ... is an action to which we can 
commit ourselves (prescriptivity) but which we are at the same time 
prepared to accept as exemplifying a principle of action to be 
prescribed for others in like circumstances (universalizability). 
16 Ibid., p. 69. 
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If, when we consider some proposed action, we find that when uni-
versalized, it yields prescriptions which we cannot accept, we 
reject this action as a solution to our moral problem -- if we 
cannot universalize the prescription, it cannot become an 'ought. '17 
Hare's use of this twofold character of moral judgments, then, saves his 
theory from foundational arbitrariness (which was a weakness of The 
Language of Morals), while maintaining his logical thesis, namely that 
prescriptiveness and universalizability are logical characteristics of 
moral judgments. Put differently, "prescriptivity" and "universaliza-
bility" serve a dual function: foundational and logical. 
One can, of course, argue that formalistic theories are not foun-
dational, that is, by its very definition formalism does not supply a 
foundation for morality. In discussing Kant's brand of formalism 
Bernard Williams argues that such an assessment of formalism is incor-
rect. Williams writes: 
Kant's outlook indeed requires that there can be no reason for 
morality ... but it does not imply that morality has no founda-
tions. Kant thought that we could come to understand why morality 
should rightly present itself to the rational agent as a categorical 
demand.18 
It is this "prescriptiveness" which, then, is one grounding of the foun-
dations of the formalistic perspective. The other, it is being argued, 
is "uni versa 1 i zabil ity." The case in point being argued is Ha re's pos i -
ti on. 
17R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, pp. 89-90. 
18Bernard Williams, Ethics and Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 55. 
13 
To reiterate, the function of moral judgments, according to Hare, 
is to commend or guide choices -- prescriptivity, that is, the descrip-
tive import of moral judgments, if any, is subordinate to their pre-
scriptive import. This needs to be argued for, though, and not merely 
asserted. 
Hare supplies two such arguments: 1) He insists that words such 
as "good" cannot be defined in non-value terms. Hare gives the example 
of a strawberry. If we assert that "S is a good strawberry" we might be 
led to conclude that this means nothing more than "S is a strawberry and 
S is sweet, juicy, firm, red and large. 1119 Such an assertion, Hare 
thinks, excludes us from saying things about strawberries which we 
ordinarily say for instance that a strawberry is good because it is 
sweet. This is different from saying that a strawberry is a sweet 
strawberry because it is sweet. "Good, 11 then , does not denote; it is 
not a descriptive term. The function of "good" for Hare is: 
Value terms have a special function in language, that of commending; 
and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which 
do not perform this function: for if this is done, we are deprived 
of a means of performing the function.20 
Again, Hare is asserting what he needs to argue for, that is, he 
is including his conclusion (that the function of "good" is to commend) 
in his conclusion while it ought, logically, to be part of the premise. 
19 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 85-86. 
20 Ibid., p. 91. 
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At another level, it is an empirical question if a lack of a definition 
of 11 good 11 restricts one's ability to commend. To assert that a straw-
berry is sweet is to commend it; and to further say that the strawberry 
is good is only to emphasize this point. We simply are not hampered in 
commending because we have a definition of what makes an object good. 
Hare is mistaken. 
The second argument Hare considers concerns 11 ought 11 rather than 
11 good, 11 but his conclusion is the same, namely that it is intended to 
apply to all moral terms. Hare argues: 
It is because I can act in this way or that, that I ask, 'Shall I 
act in this way or that?'; and it is, typically, in my deliberations 
about this 'Shall I?' question that I ask the further, but related 
question, 'Ought I to do this or that?' Thus it is because they are 
prescriptive that moral words possess the property which is summed 
up ... in the slogan -- 111 0ught 11 implies 11 can. 111 21 
Again, Hare's argument is problematic. Merely because an utter-
ance is prescriptive it does not follow that one is capable of 
fulfilling it. I can be commanded, for instance, to do fifty situps in 
a situp contest. The command is not any less intelligible or less pre-
scriptive because I can do thirty situps. Commands have different 
purposes, and for Hare to reduce them to one is reductionist. One pur-
pose of a command is to find out the extent or limit of a task. 
11 0ught, 11 at least in this sense, does not imply 11 can. 11 Hare further 
21 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 51. 
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argues that the sense in which "ought" implies "can" is not that of 
logical entailment. But to pursue Hare in this reflection is beyond the 
focus of this Dissertation. 
We are merely trying to clarify Hare's approach to morality to 
have a basis for critiquing his formalism later. But since Hare says 
that imperatives do not imply "can" in the strict sense of logical 
entailment, it follows that imperatives do not imply "can" in the same 
way as they imply "ought," or as "ought" implies "can." This means that 
Hare is entirely mistaken when he insists that "ought" statements are 
prescriptive, for if "ought" does not imply "can" in the sense of logi-
cal entailment, the only alternative is that "ought" implies "can" with 
the mediation of a descriptive statement, that is, "ought" statements 
supply information. 
Likewise, to insist that value judgments entail imperatives, that 
they do not provide information about the objects of choice, is mis-
guided. The best Hare can say is that SOME value judgments entail 
imperatives. He does not take into account the complexity of human 
beings -- some people use factual statements to guide their choices. Or 
at least there is a much more complex relationship between information 
and imperatives than Hare considers. It would seem more correct to say 
that imperatives guide conduct, not choices. The command to make cer-
tain corrections in this Dissertation by members of my doctoral commit-
tee guides my conduct, not my choices. 
16 
W. D. Hudson brings out a number of arguments against Hare's con-
cept of 11 prescriptivism. 1122 Hudson notes that some philosophers argue 
against Hare's prescriptivism by arguing 11 that a man may judge morality 
by one set of principles and conduct his life, or advise others to con-
duct theirs by another set. 1123 This means that one's moral judgment may 
not be prescriptive in Hare's sense. But Hudson thinks this critique of 
Hare is misguided because Hare's prescriptivism is a logical theory and 
not a theory of moral commitment. Hudson writes: 
It is one thing to be committed to the principle that one ought to 
practice what one preaches, quite another to believe that one cannot 
(logically) hold sincerely to a moral principle an24not, given the physical and psychological opportunity, act upon it. 
The issue, then, is that Hare's prescriptivism is not affected by 
critics, like Macintyre, 25 who argue that prescriptivism infers that an 
individual can morally judge actions by one standard and guide her own 
moral conduct by another. Hudson continues: 
It may well be the case that Hare, as a liberal moralist, subscribes 
to the former opinion; but what makes him a prescriptivist is some-
thing quite different, namely the fact that he holds the logical 
belief just stated.26 
22w. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, Second Edition. (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). 
23 Ibid., p. 205. 
24 Ibid., p. 204. 
25see, Alasdair Macintyre, 11 What Morality Is Not. 11 Philosophy, 
Vol. XXXII (1957), p. 330. 
26w. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 205. 
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G. Warnock has argued that moral judgments do much more than pre-
scribe. They also command, implore, and so on. 27 But again, according 
to Hudson, this is not a telling critique of prescriptivism. Warnock 1 s 
contention is true, but "simply to present a list such as Warnock's will 
not in itself dispose of prescriptivism. 1128 
The real criticism of Hare's prescriptivism is that it leads to an 
absurd notion of morality. Hudson writes: 
. . . it seems to follow that it would make perfectly good sense to 
say that anything whatever was good or that any conceivable course 
of action ought to be taken. I could not (logically) offer anything 
whatever as a reason for a moral judgment ... 29 
Finally, before we analyze Hare's brand of formalism in more de-
tail, let us note that Hare commits the "Socratic Heresy, 11 namely that 
we never act in a way contrary to what we think to be right. 
sists on the following problematic conclusion: 
Hare in-
Moral judgements always have a possible bearing on our conduct in 
that we cannot in the fullest sense accept them without conforming 
to them.30 
Hare is saying: 
1) Although moral judgments are prescriptive, one's moral princi-
ples are derived from one's personal decisions. 
27G. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1967), p. 35. 
28w. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 205. 
29 Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
30R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 67. 
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2) It is illogical (contradictory) for one to adopt rule 11 R11 and, 
at the same time, decide not to act according to it. 
Hare's conclusion flies in the face of human experience. If Hare were 
correct that we never act in a manner contrary to that which we think to 
be right, the assertion 11 I am going to work, although I'm burnt out and 
know I ought to go on vacation 11 would not make sense. 
One could, perhaps, argue that 11 ought 11 in the above type of example 
is being used in a special, non-typical way -- a position that Hare 
seems to be leaning toward. 31 But Hare is mistaken if he thinks that 11 I 
ought to do X11 is incompatible (or contradictory) to saying, 11 I do not 
intend on doing X even though I ought to do X. 11 This utterance may 
sound odd, but it is not logically defective. If Hare is to be consis-
tent in insisting that moral judgments guide conduct, he must admit that 
a person can act contrary to her moral principles. As Hare notes: 
The ethical theory which has been briefly set out in the preceding 
chapters is a type of prescriptivism in that it maintains that it is 
one of the characteristics of moral terms ... that judgments con-
cerning them are, as typically used, intended to guide conduct.32 
If we always do what we think we ought to do, if we never do what we 
ought not to do, anything would be permitted. 
31 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 67. 
32R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p.67. 
19 
Hare, then, has the following view: Suppose someone says, 11 I ought 
to do X. 11 According to Hare, if this is a moral argument it depends on 
two conditions. The first is that 11 ought11 is being used in a sense 
that entails the desire or willingness to do whatever it is that ought 
to be done. This is the prescriptive feature of moral judgment we dis-
cussed earlier. At this point if the individual were to add, 11 So? I 
won't do it, 11 she would be failing to use 11 ought 11 in the sense required 
for a moral judgment. We have already seen that there are philosophical 
difficulties in holding this position. 
The second condition is that the prescriptive principle (such as, 
"Promises ought to be kept") is recognized as applying to everyone, that 
is, the judgment will be the same for anyone else in the same circum-
stances. If a person claims that she is not obliged to keep promises, 
she must be willing to allow that all others may act in this way, even 
when they have made promises to her. 
If the individual is not willing to do this, she cannot excuse 
herself on the grounds that there is a moral principle to the effect 
that it is morally permissible to break promises. In Hare's terminolo-
gy, moral judgments must be universalizable. It is clear that if these 
two conditions are satisfied, the reasons advanced in deciding what 
ought to be done must be considered as overriding by the person making 
the decision. In this theory there is no appeal to any content supposed 
to be characteristic of moral standards, principles or judgments. Put 
differently, any judgment that is both prescriptive and universalizable 
is, by virtue of possessing these features alone, a moral one. 
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W. D. Hudson argues that Hare's concept of 11 universalizability 11 has 
often been misunderstood. 21 Hare is not saying that because moral 
judgments are universalizable a person ought "to be a busybody, always 
poking one's nose in other people's ethical concerns. 1122 The univers-
alizability characteristic of moral judgments likewise does not in any 
way encourage people to be "intolerant with those who disagree with one 
on moral issues. 1123 
Rather, Hare's point about universalizability is a logical one. 
Hudson writes: 
His point is simply that, in saying 11 X is wrong because it is Y , 11 I 
must, if I have really given the complete reason for what I say, be 
saying that anything else which is Y is also to that extent wrong.24 
Another criticism of Hare's universality characteristic of moral 
judgments is that he neglects to notice the complexity of moral judg-
ments. But as Hudson notes, Hare takes pains to distinguish between 
"universality and genera 1ity. 1125 Thus, 11 A moral judgment can be uni-
versalizable and at the same time very specific. 1126 
Hudson also wants to argue that the manner in which Hare 1 s univer-
salizability characteristic of moral judgments is made is vital to 
21w. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, Second Edition. (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). 
22 Ibid., p. 210. 
23 Ibid., p. 210. 
24 Ibid., p. 210. 
25 Ibid., p. 211. 
26 Ibid., p. 211. 
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its interpretation. 27 One need not, for instance, continually try to 
formulate the universalizability characteristic in such a way that it 
avoids being logically applied only to actions done at a certain place 
and time. This would make the universalizability characteristic illogi-
cal. Hudson asserts that such a possible state of affairs as the above 
does not exist. He writes: 
The only reasons which would be recognized as moral reasons are such 
as render the judgment grounded in them universalizable.28 
Our concern here is not with the form of moral reasoning Hare advo-
cates, but with the way he distinguishes the moral domain. His account 
seems to be solely an attempt to describe what is common to moral exper-
ience in all its diverse forms. If this is correct, he must already 
have been able to identify in some fashion various manifestations of 
moral practices. Had Hare been looking for a pattern of relationships 
between moral practices on some basis other than on common essential 
features, he might not have concluded that the distinguishing character-
istics were entirely formal. 
At any rate, to the extent that these formal characteristics do 
belong to moral judgment, they seem to be common to all normative in-
quiry. The judgment that settles what a person should do may satisfy 
the prescriptive and universalizable conditions, but still be of the 
kind many people would call aesthetic or prudential, say, rather than 
moral. 
27 Ibid., p. 212. 
28 Ibid., p. 212. 
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People sometimes do recognize certain reasons and judgments as 
moral and as relevant to what they should do if they were disposed to 
act morally. However, in making a decision, they give greater weight to 
various kinds of non-moral reasons. For example, they may agree that 
moral reasons should be taken into account but refuse to treat them as 
overriding. If Hare's theory of purely formal criteria were correct, it 
is difficult to see how this situation could arise in moral experience. 
For, following Hare's logic, any prescriptive and universalizable judg-
ment on which a person acts is, by definition, a moral judgment. 
In fact, it is doubtful whether the universalizable characteristic 
is strictly necessary for a judgment to be moral. When a person decides 
that she should act in a way that is clearly beyond the level of common 
duty, she may be unwilling to claim that all other people in her posi-
tion should do the same thing. She may judge, for instance, that 
certain characteristics of her own life, which she cannot assume are 
common to all people, are relevant to the moral decision in this case. 
Of course, she may agree to the universalizable characteristic in the 
very weak sense that anyone else exactly like herself should make the 
same judgment in the situation. 
In illustrating the principle of universalizability, Hare asks us 
to test some proposed way of acting by considering how we would feel if 
others were to act in this way toward us. The test assumes that an 
individual is prepared to treat her own feelings as being of the same 
kind, for moral purposes, as anyone else's. It also assumes that one's 
feelings about the way one is being treated are necessarily relevant to 
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moral judgment. A question to ask is: What weight should the inter-
ests, desires, needs and feelings of human beings be given in moral 
inquiry? This is an issue of content, and one on which moral systems, 
all of which presumably exhibit the formal criteria, differ. 
What will be argued here is that Hare's brand of formalism is 
predicated on an incorrect analysis of the nature of meaning. 29 Hare 
writes: 
Value terms have a special function in language, that of commending: 
and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which 
themselves do not perform this function; for if this is done, we are 
deprived of a means of performing that function.30 
And in another place: 
Almost every word in our language is capable of being used on oc-
casion as a value-word (that is, for commending or its opposite); 
and usually it is only by cross-examining a speaker that we can tell 
whether he is so using a word.31 
It is here that Hare is clearly involved in a contradiction. In the 
first paragraph, Hare gives a special status and function to value 
terms, that of commending. In fact, this is true by definition for 
Hare. Yet in the second paragraph the class of commending terms is 
broadened to include almost any term. A term commends or does not 
commend depending on the speaker's intention. 
29Alasdair Macintyre develops this thought in a different context 
in Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Philosophy, Chapter 
Four. 
30R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 91. 
31 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 79-80. 
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Hare cannot have it both ways. The error of his ways lies in his 
mistaken assumption that because there are some non-descriptive terms in 
English whose meaning is the function they perform, 11 and 11 and 11 this 11 
being two examples, then the term 11 good11 is in the same class. This is 
clearly false. 11 Good 11 does not function the same way as 11 and. 11 Put 
differently, if one says '"Good' is used to commend, 11 and another person 
says 111 If' is used to connect, 11 the two speakers are not implying that 
the meaning of 11 good 11 and 11 if 11 is simply the function which they per-
form. 
Hare supplies a way out of this dilemma without knowing it. As 
was previously pointed out, Hare states that whether or not a term is 
being used to commend depends on the speaker's intention. The function 
of 11 and 11 and 11 if , 11 on the other hand, is a convention of language, that 
is, the function of these types of words does not depend on the speak-
er's intention. Likewise, commending (like questioning) is not a func-
tion of an individual term, like 11 and 11 or 11 if. 11 Hare's mistake, then, 
is in assuming that such assertions as 11 good 11 are used to commend and 
11 if 11 is used to connect share a similar function, namely their meaning 
is a function of their performance. What we are showing is that com-
mending is a function of expressions, not individual terms. Hare 
himself should have noticed this. There is no other conclusion to be 
drawn if Hare accepts his contention that whether or not a term is being 
used to commend depends on the speaker's intention. If the above is 
correct, Hare's formalism suffers serious defects and cannot be a cor-
rect analysis of the nature and characteristics of moral judgments. 
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A second representative of the formalist approach to moral judg-
ment is the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. We feel justified in 
including an analysis of his formalist philosophical position because it 
is precisely that, a philosophical theory. We will limit ourselves to 
his philosophical remarks and assumptions. We also feel justified in 
analyzing his position in this Dissertation because he relies on Hare, 
Kant and Rawls, all formalists, albeit of different persuasions, in 
developing his own theoretical formalistic constructs. 
One prevalent notion of morality is that one's moral judgment is 
related to a set of acquired "good habits. 11 These good habits are 
thought to be acquired by different sorts of training. The Freudian 
notion of the internalization of various rules is an example. 
A habit is not merely an activity, though. It is more of a ten-
dency. William Frankena defines habit as: 
. a disposition or dispositional property of a mind or person, 
something that need not be activated at a given time and yet may 
correctly be said to be present.32 
Blindly following a specific code or value system whenever X type of 
stimulus is present is not what philosophers generally mean by habit. 
Rather, a disposition or tendency is involved, not merely some type of 
activity. 
32w . 11 . i iam 
(Glenview, ILL.: 
Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education. 
Scott, Foresman and Co., 1965), p. 2. 
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The concept of habit, then, is a positive one, not one in which a 
person is a blind follower of stimuli. It is not enough for a person to 
have acquired a habit, her reasons for acting must also be considered. 
A person can obviously act justly for unjust reasons. The terms 11 habit, 11 
"disposition," and "excellence" will be used synonymously. 
In order for the individual to enjoy the "good life, 11 it is neces-
sary that she develop certain dispositions or habits rather than others, 
according to the logic of this view. She needs self-control, for in-
stance, if she is to actualize her long-range goals. She cannot succumb 
to every immediate inclination or desire. 
Likewise, the person cannot enjoy the "good life" apart from soci-
ety. In fact, the "good life" is a shared social experience, as John 
Dewey argued. 33 And the perpetuation of a viable society depends upon 
the quality of the dispositions or habits of its members. Dewey contin-
ues: 
... habits of doing, thinking and feeling from the older to the 
younger. Without this communication ideals, hopes, expectations, 
standards, opinions from those members of society who are passing 
out of the group life to those who are coming into it, social life 
could not survive.34 
Various philosophers have articulated different conceptions of 
11 habit 11 and "dispositions." In an attempt to be clear regarding this 
brand of formalism, two such philosophers will be mentioned: Aristotle 
and John Dewey. Aristotle believed that the individual ought to develop 
33John Dewey, Democracy and Education. (New York: The MacMillan 
Co • , 1916 ) , p • 2 • 
34 Ibid., p. 3. 
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those dispositions or habits which aid in living the "good life." (A 
position similar to Aristotle's will be examined in detail later in this 
Dissertation when we consider virtue ethics). The "good life" for 
Aristotle is one in which the individual is able to engage in the maxi-
mum amount of "intrinsically excellent activities." Earning a living, 
for instance, is necessary to make the "good life" possible. 
Aristotle lists the types of dispositions or habits which aid the 
individual in choosing the morally right action. They include the fol-
lowing: 1) courage, 2) temperance, 3) justice, 4) truthfulness, and 5) 
friendliness. 35 His basic point is that the individual ought to choose 
the right action because it is right. A person, then, habitually, yet 
deliberately, ought to choose the right action for its own sake. Since 
individuals have different capacities and social functions, each person 
achieves "virtue" to the degree possible. Not everyone is called to 
perfection, according to this view: 
All persons share in the different parts of the soul, but in 
different ways. The slave is entirely without the faculty of 
deliberation; the woman does possess it, but in an unauthoritarian 
form; and if children also have it, it is only in an immature 
form.36 
Aristotle claims that virtue is related to practice. Put differ-
ently, one becomes virtuous by doing virtuous acts. He believes that we 
35Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, Chapter 1, 1123b, 1125a, 
trans. by H. Rackham. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1934). 
36 Ibid. 
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begin these habitual practices by performing acts which are objectively 
virtuous. We do not have an immediate or intuitive knowledge that the 
acts we perform are virtuous, according to Aristotle. Thus, virtue is a 
habit which is developed from a particular capacity through the further 
exercise or habitual use of that capacity. 
John Dewey likewise writes about the role of habit in making ethi-
cal judgments. Dewey defines the ethical person as one who deliberates 
about an end to be achieved by a specific action. 37 Yet for Dewey this 
deliberate activity presupposes types of habits. He writes: 
Our ideas, like our sensations, depend on experience. And the ex-
perience upon which they both depend is the operation of habits.38 
Dewey further argued that a person's making of moral judgments 
cannot be separated from her social experiences. Customs are the case 
in point. As Dewey says in Human Nature and Conduct: II for prac-
tical purposes morals means customs, folkways, established collective 
habits. 1139 Although Dewey does stress this notion of habit, he also 
argues that habit can become mechanical, or merely lead to a perpetua-
tion of the status quo. Thus, "impulse" is as necessary a characteris-
37John Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics. (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1891), p. 3. 
38 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social 
Psychology. (New York: Modern Library, 1922), p. 32. 
39 Ibid., p. 75. 
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tic of moral judgment as is habit. Put differently, it is only through 
the exercise of "intelligence" that both habit and impulse are mediated 
for Dewey. If the environment constitutes a situation in which X habit 
is detrimental to the common good, say, "intelligence" seeks to redirect 
a change. New types of customs and new institutions are thus created. 
Dewey does believe that it is possible to work within already 
existing social institutions and moral standards. But when society's 
institutions lead to alienation or despair, it is time for "intelli-
gence" to begin to tentatively resolve the problematic situation. The 
only end for the moral agent, then, is growth, according to Dewey 
both individual and social growth. Dewey writes that "growth itself is 
the only moral end. 1140 
Dewey does not believe that the ends are separable from the means. 
Growth consists of the development of a person in an harmonious and 
integrated manner. The end for a person is not a fixed or absolute 
state of perfection as it appears to have been for Aristotle. Moral 
growth, of which moral judgment, using the habit of intelligence, is 
integral, includes the ability of the agent to intelligently understand 
the various alternatives open to her -- and to make appropriate judg-
ments regarding the alternatives. Thus, for Dewey, "fact" and "value" 
meet. Put differently, values are constituted in the act of evaluating 
itself. A value statement for Dewey is one which fulfills certain con-
40John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy. 
Books, 1948), p. 177. 
(New York: Mentor 
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textual conditions. If one's activity leads to the ability to make more 
viable moral judgments, if it leads to further growth, then that activ-
ity is valuable. 41 
A value, then, is not a distinct entity apart from the world of 
reality. Rather, the particular situation determines if an activity (or 
a moral judgment) is valuable or not. Dewey writes: 
Appraisals of courses of action as better and worse, more or less 
serviceable, are as empirically justified as are non-valuative 
propositions about impersonal subject matter.42 
The intent now, then, is to note Kohlberg's criticism of the 11 vir-
tue as good habits" theory. Kohlberg's claim is that habit has no place 
in moral theory and habit has no relationship to moral judgment. 
Kohlberg seems to reduce habit to a behavioristic interpretation. He 
writes: 
The contrast between these experimental studies and the child 
rearing studies suggests that direct training and physical types of 
punishment may be effective in producing short-run situational con-
formity but do not directly produce general internalized habits of 
moral character carried into later life, carried outside the home, 
or carried into permissive situations.43 
41 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty. (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1960), p. 260. 
42 Ibid. , p. 2 2. 
43Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and Moral 
Ideology, 11 Review of Child Develo ment Research, Eds. Martin Hoffman and 
L. Hoffman. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 389. 
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Kohlberg, then, is reducing habit to training, punishment and re-
ward. This concept of habit is not philosophically defensible. As was 
previously argued, good habits are not merely produced through a 
punishment and reward orientation. Rather, as Dewey suggests, a habit 
is a disposition by which the individual uses her intelligence to medi-
ate a problematic moral situation. In a word, Dewey's philosophical 
notion of habit is much more complicated than Kohlberg's: a habit is 
not merely a response to X stimulus. If this is Kohlberg's criticism of 
the behaviorist's notion of habit, he is certainly correct, but it is a 
philosophical mistake to reduce all concepts of habit to this model. 
Furthermore, Kohlberg is involved in a contradiction. He denies 
the importance of habit in moral judgments, yet some notion of habit is 
indispensable in his cognitive-developmental theory of moral decision-
making. As William Alston writes: 
. even if one were able to get along in moral psychology without 
any reference to habits of behavior, and this may be Kohlberg 1 s 
aspiration, his own examples illustrate the difficulty of getting 
along without using habit concepts at any level.44 
What Alston is arguing is that each stage of moral growth Kohlberg has 
delineated incorporates some cognition of a problem with specific types 
of behavioral concepts -- reward and punishment at a particular stage of 
moral development, for example. Thus, Alston is arguing that each stage 
44william P. Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is To Ought,"' 
Genetic Epistemology, Ed. Theodore Mischel. (New York: Academic Press, 
1970), p. 281. 
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of moral development has incorporated in it some notion of habit -- a 
habit which defines the stage and whose transcending is necessary in the 
move to a higher stage. 
Kohlberg is in opposition to the "stimulus-response" paradigm of 
habit. His claim that an overemphasis on habitual moral judgment (or 
behavior) can lead to rigidity and conformity is obvious. It doesn't 
follow, though, that habit has virtually no place in moral judgment. 
Even if it were argued that Aristotle's definition and enumeration of 
habits were inadequate, it would not mean that habit has no relevance to 
moral judgment making. 
The same critique of Hare's criterion of universalizability can be 
applied to Kohlberg. We do not want to rehash old ground here but to 
present Kohlberg's analysis of moral motivation, especially as it ap-
plies to forming moral judgments. It is in Kohlberg's arguments 
regarding moral motivation that he differs from Hare -- who, it seems, 
regards prescriptivity as the foundation of moral motivation. One acts 
because one ought to, because it is one's duty to do X, because one's 
moral judgment regarding X has prescriptive value. 
Let us examine the notion of moral motivation more carefully. In 
an article written with Daniel Candee, Kohlberg analyzes empirical 
studies which attempted to correlate the relationship between moral 
judgment and moral action. 45 The classical study of this issue was by 
45Lawrence Kohlberg and Daniel Candee, "The Relationship of Moral 
Judgment to Moral Action," Essa son Moral Develo ment, Vol. II, The 
~--='..,_-:-~~~~-:-:-..,.....,....!--~~--,..,..,-~~-:--Psychology of Moral Development, Ed. Lawrence Kohlberg. New York: 
Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 498-581. 
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Hartshorne and May in which they attempted to correlate the relationship 
between the degree of convinction an individual had toward a moral 
value, such as honesty, and the person's moral actions. 46 
Going back to Aristotle, Hartshorne and May seemed to be assuming 
that virtue is learned and that it is guided by reason. Their method-
ology was to: 
look inductively at behaviors loosely corresponding to 
common-sense conceptions of honesty, correlating these behaviors 
with one a?other and with tests of moral knowledge and moral 
attitude. 
Hartshorne and May, then, attempted to demonstrate that the adolescent 
world could be divided into individuals who cheated and those who did 
not on the experimental tests given them. They also tried to demon-
strate that the adolescents who cheated in one situation were more 
likely to cheat in another. Their data was predicated on the belief 
that moral behavior can be predicted from verbal reports on the values 
the adolescent adhered to. 
Hartshorne and May were not able to validate their hypotheses. In 
fact, they even found that cheating in one situation did not necessarily 
predict cheating in other situations. 48 Kohlberg and Candee proceed to 
46 Kohlberg and Candee 1 s analysis of Hartshorne and May is found on 
pp. 498-502. 
47 Ibid., p. 499. 
48 Ibid., pp. 499-500. 
"': .. ' ' ' 
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34 
argue that Hartshorne and May overlooked a moral ~motion component and a 
moral judgment component. 49 Their arguments here need to be assessed. 
Kohlberg and Candee suggest that perhaps Hartshorne and May's fail-
ure to validate their hypotheses 11 was due to a test method in which 
subjects were not emotionally invested in following or violating a stan-
dard.1150 They reject this argument, though: 
Thus, we also feel that emotional arousal does not seem to be an 
internal determinant necessary to define moral behavior.51 
It seems like Kohlberg and Candee are attacking a 11 straw man. 11 Who 
ever suggested that emotional arousal defined moral behavior? Even the 
theories Kohlberg and Candee reject, such as 11 resistence to temptation 
studies, 11 11 fantasy punishment reacti ons 11 or 11 tota 1 guilt measures, 1152 do 
not conclude that emotional arousal 11 defines moral behavior. 11 There is 
certainly a difference between saying that emotional arousal is an es-
sential component in moral behavior and arguing that it defines moral 
behavior. Kohlberg and Candee 1 s confusion is obvious when they argue 
that emotional arousal is not an internal determinant NECESSARY to 
define moral behavior, using the term 11 necessary 11 the way most 
philosophers use the term 11 sufficient. 11 It is hard to imagine that any 
person would ever argue that emotional arousal played such a strong part 
49 Ibid., p. 500. 
5olbid., p. 501. 
51 Ibid., p. 502. 
52 Ibid., p. 575. 
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in moral action. Such a claim is certainly counter intuitive. No sense 
could be made of moral freedom if the above were true. 
Kohlberg and Candee then investigate theorists who argue that there 
is an integral connection between moral knowledge and moral behavior, a 
position Kohlberg himself adopts in a different form than the theorists 
he and Candee mention. In the main, these theorists, such as Brown and 
Herrnstein, Milgram, Zimbardo, and Latane, "suggest that undergraduates 
and adults act immorally despite their moral judgment action capacities 
under suitable institutional and situational incentives and pres-
sures.1153 Kohlberg and Candee argue that such studies are mistaken due 
to their two-track theory of moral learning and growth. They write: 
In our view moral judgment development both causes action and arises 
out of the action itself. A new moral judgment may guide new behav-
ior while the performance of a new behavior may lead one to con-
struct a new moral judgment. In either case, however, there is a 
unitary developmental process involved in the development of both 
moral judgment and action.54 
Kohlberg and Candee also notice another reason why both types of 
theorists, those who argued for a moral emotion component to moral 
judgment making and those who argued for cognitive factors, failed: 
The reason for this failure, we believe, lies in the fact that when 
confronted with a real moral situation individuals do not reason in 
terms of abstract values but rather define the situation in terms of 
concrete rights and duties.55 
53 Ibid., p. 505-506. 
54 Ibid., p. 575. 
55 Ibid., p. 578. 
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Thus to insist to an individual that cheating is always wrong, an ab-
stract moral prohibition, is translated by the individual into specific 
situational terms, such as 11 If you cheat and get caught you are in 
trouble." Kohlberg and Candee argue that this conclusion is born out by 
their empirical research in which 11 the observed relationship between 
moral judgment stage and action indicates that there is often a 
relationship between the way in which subjects define rights and duties 
in hypothetic verbal situations and the ways in which they define them 
in actual ones. 1156 
Kohlberg and Candee supply two reasons why the research arrives at 
this conclusion. The first they call the 11 personal consistency or per-
sonal responsibility approach. 1157 In this approach moral actions are 
defined as those which are consistent with what the individual judges to 
be right. The other approach is termed 11 universal right. 1158 And this 
approach is predicated on the view that an action is judged moral 
because it is consistent with an objective or universal moral principle. 
A critique of the conclusions of the research in social psychology 
Kohlberg and Candee assess, as well as their own research findings, is 
beyond the competency of this writer. But a few philosophical remarks 
can be made regarding Kohlberg's concept of moral motivation. It is to 
some of Kohlberg's other work, then, that we now turn. 
56 Ibid., p. 579. 
57 Ibid., p. 579. 
58 Ibid. , p. 579. 
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Kohlberg, on the other hand, does argue that motivation is impor-
tant in moral judgment making. Merely because he labels his theory 
cognitive-developmental, it does not follow that he is not interested in 
moral motivation. Nor does it follow that the cognitive domain and the 
affective are totally separate or qualitatively different. In fact, 
Kohlberg believes that both cognitive and affective aspects are present 
in moral judgment making. 59 
Individuals at different stages of moral development make moral 
judgments based on different motivational criteria, for Kohlberg. At 
Stage 1, individuals are motivated by the desire to avoid punishment. 
The primary motive for making moral judgments at Stage 2 is a desire for 
reward or benefit. At Stage 3 the motivating concept is anticipation of 
the disapproval of others. In other words, the individual feels guilty 
because of the reaction of someone else -- or the anticipated or per-
ceived reaction of someone else. At Stage 4 individuals are motivated 
by a sense of community respect. Judgment leading to an action which 
might receive the condemnation of the community is one which the Stage 4 
individual feels she ought to avoid. It must be kept in mind that 
Kohlberg develops his arguments based on data received during moral 
judgment interviews. What he is actually analyzing is moral judgment 
making, not moral action taking. If Kohlberg has something meaningful 
59see, Lawrence Koh 1 berg, "From Is To Ought: How To Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Develop-
ment," Essa son Moral Develo ment: Vol. 1, The Philoso h of Moral 
Development, Ed. Lawrence Kohlberg. New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1981), pp. 183-189. 
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meaningful to say about moral judgment, either by way of empirical evi-
dence or philosophical argumentation, the moral philosopher needs to 
listen. 
At Stage 5, then, an important motivational distinction is made 
between community condemnation and self-condemnation. The Stage 5 
individual's moral judgments are not merely based on the needs of the 
community; she also wants to avoid judging herself as wrong, irrational 
or inconsistent. She still is concerned with the proper development of 
the good of the community, though. The point is that she has broadened 
h t . 60 er perspec ive. She looks at both self-condemnation and community 
condemnation as reciprocal issues. It is not until Stage 6 that self-
condemnation becomes the modus operandi of moral judgments. At Stage 6 
individuals achieve self-respect by acting upon self-accepted moral 
principles. 61 
There is also a relationship between motivation and moral judgment 
making, intuition and knowledge. It is at this point that Kohlberg 1 s 
arguments become difficult to grasp. Although he seems to ask the right 
questions (questions about knowledge appropriate to moral judgment 
making, for instance, which analytical philosophers like Hare do not 
raise), Kohlberg 1 s answers seem fuzzy. For example, he notes that 
knowledge is a kind of philosophical intuition, and the individual who 
60Lawrence Kohlberg, 11 Indoctrination Versus Relativity in Value 
Education, 11 in The Philosophy of Moral Development, pp. 6-28. 
61 Ib1'd.' 19 22 pp. - . 
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possesses this knowledge makes appropriate moral judgments which lead 
her to act. 62 In fact, he suggests that once the individual has 
intuited that 11 X11 is right, she will be motivated to perform 11 X. 11 This 
contention will be discussed in some detail later. 
Kohlberg, then, does assume that motivation is an important element 
in moral judgment making. Yet, in his theoretical framework of the 
stages of moral development, for example (concepts of rights, duties, 
justice, etc.), he only includes one motivational concept out of the 
thirty possible at each stage. What motivates the individual to con-
sistently make more appropriate and reliable moral judgments? It 
certainly isn't contradictory to argue that Kohlberg's cognitive and 
motivational criteria are merely necessary conditions for progress in 
moral judgment making, not sufficient conditions. 
Even though we have noted that Kohlberg sees a relationship between 
cognitive and affective factors in the development of moral judgment-
making, he does stress cognitive factors often to the neglect of the 
very motivational factors he assumes must be present. He writes: 
..• the cognitive-developmental view holds that cognition and 
affect are different aspects of, or perspectives on, the same mental 
events, that all mental events have both cognitive and affective 
62see, for instance, Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious 
Education and the Public Schools: A Developmental View, 11 in The Phi-
losophy of Moral Development, pp. 294-305. 
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affective aspects, and that the development of mental 
reflects structural changes recognizable in both 
affective perspectives.63 
dispositions 
cognitive and 
Yet he makes the untenable claim that 11 the presence of 
strong emotion in no way reduces the cognitive component of moral judg-
ment.1164 He does not specify in any detail how this affective domain 
operates. He does not offer arguments, either empirical or theoretical, 
to convince one that the affective domain is integral to development in 
moral judgment making although, as was said, some relationship is 
demanded by the sequence of stages of moral development he presents . 
. . . moral judgment dispositions influence action through being 
stable cognitive dispositions, not through the affective changes 
with which they are associated. Textbook psychology preaches the 
cliche that moral decisions are products of algebraic resolution of 
conflicting quantitative affective forces ... Affective forces are 
involved in moral decisions, but affect is neither moral nor im-
moral. When the affective arousal is channeled into moral 
directions, it is moral; when it is not so channeled, it is not. 
The moral channeling mechanisms themselves are cognitive.65 
In effect, Kohlberg is denying what he purports to argue for, name-
ly that affect has an integral place in moral judgment making. If 
"channeling" is all that is called for, affect is to be controlled; it 
does not afford an essentially creative ingredient in moral judgment 
making. In fact, it is not clear what place motivation has, in 
63Lawrence Koh 1 berg, 11 Stages of Mora 1 Deve 1 opment 
Moral Education," Moral Education: Interdisci linar 
C. M. Beck, B. Crittenden and E. V. Sullivan. Toronto: 
Toronto Press, 1971), p. 44. 
64 Ibid., p. 44. 
65Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is To Ought," p. 139. 
a Basis for 
roaches, Eds. 
University of 
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Kohlberg's scheme, although he wants to argue that moral motivation is 
essential, albeit reducible to a cognitive mechanism. This is unfortun-
ate because if Kohlberg had been clearer, he could have offered 
arguments supporting a formalist position which might have been more 
convincing than Hare's notion of prescriptivity or commending. Perhaps 
Kohlberg's formalism will fare better in his discussion of the relation-
ship between knowledge and virtue. 
Some philosophers have held that the virtuous person is also the 
knowledgeable person, that is, they see a direct connection between 
virtue and wisdom. "Knowledge implies virtue" is the oft-repeated 
slogan. Plato is perhaps the most well known philosopher who espoused 
this view. Plato believed that knowledge is found neither in sense 
perception nor true judgment. Rather, he believed that knowledge must 
be infallible and of what is real. He argued that sense perception 
cannot be the whole of knowledge because some types of knowledge involve 
arguments and terms which are not perceived through the senses. Mathe-
. . . . t 66 mat1cs is a case in po1n . 
Plato, then, believed that knowledge is possible, and that it in-
volves that which is both infallible and permanent. What Plato meant is 
that knowledge involves that which is universal. Frederick Copleston, 
commenting on Plato, writes: 
66Plato discusses this, among other places, in The Republic in the 
metaphor of the Divided Line. 
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... true knowledge is knowledge of the universal. Particular 
constitutions change, but the concept of goodness remains the same, 
and it is in reference to this stable concept that we judge of 
particular constitutions in respect of goodness. It follows, then, 
that it is the universal that fulfills the requirements for being 
an object of knowledge. Knowledge of the highest universal will be 
the highest kind of knowledge, while 'knowledge' of the particular 
will be the lowest kind of knowledge.67 
Although Kohlberg has areas of disagreement with Plato (he con-
ceives of justice as equality, not as Plato's hierarchy, for instance), 
it is evident that he is a Platonist. In a neglected article (one 
necessary for fully understanding Kohlberg's philosophical commitments) 
Koh 1 berg writes, 11 . . . not only is the good one, but virtue is knowl -
edge of the good. 1168 With Hare we found that his position involved him 
in this Platonic paradox, and we offered arguments why this position is 
defective. Similar arguments, then, apply to Kohlberg's contention that 
knowledge is integral to moral judgment which issues in moral action, 
that is, once moral knowledge is known there is a direct correlation 
between moral knowledge, correct moral judgment making and virtuous 
action. 
When Kohlberg discusses moral knowledge it is evident that he is 
not referring to empirical facts (again like Hare) -- nor opinion nor 
social convention. He is referring to a type of philosophical knowledge 
or intuition -- unlike Hare. Put differently, knowledge, for Kohlberg, 
67Frederick Copleston, S. J., A Histor of Philoso h , Vol. 1: 
Greece and Rome. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962 , 
p. 175. 
68Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of 
the Platonic View, 11 Moral Education: Five Lectures, Ed. T. · Sizer. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 58. 
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is an ideal form, like justice, and it is not arbitrary or relative. 
Knowledge includes, of course, personal conviction and commitment, 
according to this view. Knowledge, moral judgment and action, then, 
become inseparable. As Thomas Lickona writes: 
A given stage of cognitive development is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the parallel moral stage ... 69 
Although this view is difficult to sort out, as contemporary phil-
osophers do not seem to use this sort of language, an example might make 
the position clearer. A woman has been using marijuana for a number of 
years, say. She believes that using marijuana is harmful both physic-
ally and mentally. She understands that its use is against the law. 
Yet, she smokes it anyway. At some time in her life she begins to sus-
pect that there is more to life than the pattern of sensuality she has 
been espousing, so she turns to religion. She stops using marijuana. 
She has acquired a type of knowledge, let us argue, and from this knowl-
edge she has received conviction and commitment. 
Although the example is contrived, when Kohlberg claims that 
knowledge is virtue he seems to have this sort of situation in mind. 
Moral knowledge leads to conviction; conviction leads to proper moral 
judgment making; proper moral judgment making leads to proper moral 
action. Although the term 11 leads 11 is being used here, for Kohlberg the 
69Thomas Lickona, ed., 
Research and Social Issues. 
1976)' p. 21. 
Moral Development and Behavior -- Theory, 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
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elements of the process of philosophical (moral) intuition are insepar-
able. This argument may not make Kohlberg's claim any truer, but 
hopefully it makes it more understandable. 
One essential problem with Kohlberg's tying of moral knowledge to 
acceptable moral judgment making is that he seems to be inconsistent 
about the value of experience in the moral life. He does not convinc-
ingly demonstrate the relationship between moral knowledge and 
experience, for instance. Isn't experience a kind of knowledge, albeit 
not philosophical (or moral) intuition? What is a "live option" for one 
individual, leading to moral judgment, may be superficial or unimportant 
to another. One's attitude toward moral judgment making is certainly 
conditioned by one's experience. Being in a concentration camp during 
the Second World War and experiencing the slaughter of Jews clearly has 
import upon one's subsequent moral judgments. 
position, Blasi writes: 
Critiquing Kohlberg's 
If one should trust the present analysis ... not only do psy-
chology and social science have nothing to say about what I consider 
to be one central aspect in moral functioning (the development of a 
moral personality), but their neglect, or avoidance, is a result of 
much broader and much stronger cultural currents.70 
Kohlberg, obviously, cannot be saying that experience has no place 
in explaining the foundations of moral judgments. What he is content to 
70Augusto Blasi, "The Moral Personality: Reflections for Social 
Science and Education," Moral Education: Theor and A lication, Eds. 
Marvin Berkowitz and Fritz Oser. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1985), p. 418. 
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claim seems to be that knowledge is virtue discovered by a special type 
of human experience, philosophical or moral intuition. Thus, this moral 
knowledge is not a product of experience in the usual sense of "experi-
ence. 1171 
Yet Kohlberg seems to be involved in a dilemma. He has just argued 
that experience is the raw material upon which the cognitive and affec-
tive processes work. And he has noted that one factor in the growth of 
moral judgment making is the ability of the individual to take alterna-
tive moral roles. 72 At different stages of moral development, for 
instance, the individual 1 s response to authority, rights, obligation, 
duty, and so on are partially determined by how she perceives her 
relationship to society. The relationship between "raw human experi-
ence" and "pure philosophical intuition," as a basis for moral judgment 
making, is not at all clear. 
Although Kohlberg does claim that moral knowledge is a type of 
philosophical intuition, he does not mean to deemphasize the value of 
human experience in moral judgment making. Indeed, he cannot -- for 
human experience is the font of moral judgment making, for him. Yet the 
notion that moral knowledge is a type of philosophical intuition lends 
itself to a belief in universalizability being one of the formal charac-
teristics in answering the issue of the nature of moral judgment making. 
71 For a philosophical critique of the relationship between experi-
ence and moral principles, see Otfried Hoffe, "Autonomy and Universali-
zation as Moral Principles: A Dispute with Kohlberg, Utilitarianism and 
Discourse Ethics," Moral Education: Theory and Application, pp. 89-108. 
72see, Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is To Ought, 1111 pp. 141-142.· 
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But "lending to a belief" differs from "convincingly arguing for," and 
Kohlberg, like Hare, has not done the latter. 
Likewise, Kohlberg does not describe or define intuition. Is it a 
faculty or a process? He suggests that intuition is a kind of insight 
which is drawn out of the individual -- a position consistent with his 
Platonism. 73 Yet this is hardly a definition. Before Kohlberg's brand 
of formalism is philosophically acceptable, then, he needs further argu-
mentation. At the very least it has been shown that the areas of 
formalism he shares with Hare are susceptible to the same criticisms we 
have made of Hare's position. Kohlberg is braver than Hare in that he 
is willing to ask questions about moral knowledge and motivation and 
their relationship to moral judgment making. We will revisit these 
issues somewhat in our discussion of virtue ethics. 
73Refer to Kohlberg's "Education for Justice." 
CHAPTER III 
THE CONTENT APPROACH 
One such approach to including content into a determination of the 
characteristics of a moral judgment is that of Kurt Baier in The Moral 
Point of View. The philosophical inadequacy of justifying morality in 
terms of human wants, then, will be argued. 
Although Baier desires to contrast his position to a moral point 
of view based on the legitimacy of acting on self-interest, he winds up 
defending what he has spent time arguing against, that is, Baier accepts 
l 
that moral rules, of a fully enlightened sort anyway, are justifiable 
because they are in a person's self-interest. 74 
Baier offers a rather Hobbesian argument that without morality 
human life would degenerate into a kind of savagery in which human wants 
could not be satisfied. At the very least, his argument does not estab-
1 ish what he wants it to, namely it does not show that a person can 
realize her wants (or interests, for that matter) fully only if she 
accepts and adopt~ morality as Baier describes the moral point of view. 
It is vacuous to say that living in human society, because it presup-
74This 
(Ithaca, NY: 
is a main theme of Baier's 
Cornell University Press, 1958). 
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The Moral Point of View. 
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poses a type of morality -- a contention Baier assumes and does not ar-
gue for -- is preferable to living as a beast. At most Baier can argue 
that it is in a person's self-interest to accept a particular social 
moral code, which may, incidentally, differ from a moral code accepted 
through a laborious process of conscientious decision-making, 75 and 
abide by social rules. As was suggested, here Baier is confusing per-
sonal morality with social sanctions and rules. 
Put another way, the most Baier has shown is that it is to a per-
son's advantage to use morality, a particular social moral system. He 
has not supplied arguments why one should be moral, why it is to one's 
advantage to be moral. There are obviously occasions, though, when it 
is not to one's advantage to follow a particular social morality. To 
1 
suggest that it is in the interest of the black individual living in 
South Africa to follow the country's system of apartheid is silly. It 
would be facetious to maintain that acting morally in such a social sit-
uation promoted the black person's self-interest. 
Put more strongly, if acting morally were to be justified ulti-
mately as a matter of self-interest, even though self-interest adds 
content to the notion of moral judgments, it has no justification in the 
kind of case that was just mentioned. Even if Baier were to argue that 
75Lawrence Kohlberg develops this line of reasoning in "Moral 
Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental View, 11 Moral De-
velopment and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues. (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), pp. 31-53. 
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the previous example of South Africa is an extreme, borderline case, it 
still does not follow that a rational and thoroughly self-interested 
person will always act on the principle that what she is doing is to be 
in her best interest. If a person recognizes that she will benefit from 
acting in accord with a repressive system of morality, this will be one 
factor in the moral decision-making process. But it need not be the 
decisive factor. An individual can conclude, quite rationally, that she 
can promote her self-interest by acting inmorally, acting against a 
particular system of morality, that is. 
The above argument can be put another way. One can come to a 
point as to have no reason to believe that her judicious violation of 
moral rules will undermine the whole institution of morality whereby she 
l 
loses the general advantage it gives her. At any rate, even if an 
individual always did what was morally required because she had been 
convinced that acting morally was the best policy for getting what she 
wanted, we can think of many situations where such activity would not be 
praiseworthy. Self-interest, then, is hardly a characteristic which 
separates the moral from the non-moral. 
Let us, though, take a deeper look at Baier's position. According 
to Baier, moral judgments provide information. Baier notes that phil-
osophers who are prone to argue that moral judgments are nonfactual do 
so because they have a rather limited notion of what verification in-
valves. Baier says: 
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Philosophers rely on a highly specialized model of empirical verifi-
cation. They think of it as verification by looking, listening, 
touching, or sniffing. It should have occurred to philosophers that 
often a good deal more is involved than that. Thus, I may claim 
that the Union Theatre has 500 seats. But I cannot verify this by 
looking, listening, touching, tasting or sniffing. It should, 
therefore, be declared not to be empirically verifiable. No one has 
ever objected to counting as a nonempirical way of verifying propo-
sitions. Nor, strangely enough, to measuring or weighing. Yet 
these latter methods involve arbitrary standards and often criteria. 
But when value judgments are made, people claim that they are not 
verifiable because they involve criteria and standards.76 
Many value judgments can be verified quite easily. If one says, 
"This is a good car," the assertion can be verified by going for a ride. 
Even in this seemingly trivial case, though, one may argue that the car 
is not "good" because it does not have electric windows. In other 
words, the argument often seems to hinge on the criteria for applying 
the term "good," even to a car -- a nonethical' sense of "good." 
It is easy to notice that there is a difference between saying 
"This is a good car" and "This is good for me to do." There may be more 
agreement about the characteristics by which to measure the good car 
than the good act. Even though an enlightened philosopher notes that 
different criteria are used in legitimizing one assertion ("The good 
car" is "good" due to factual characteristics it runs smoothly, 
starts without difficulty, etc.) than another (the characteristics for 
saying "X is a good act" are not as straightforward), the issue does not 
end here. The distinction between types of assertions and types of 
76Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, p. 61. 
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characteristics for legitimizing the "goodness" or "properness" of them 
is a real distinction, but if left without further comment, the distinc-
tion is not very helpful. 
One way of elucidating the difference between the above two asser-
tions is to suggest that "This is a good car11 is a factual claim, while 
11 X is good" is, at least, more than a factual claim: it is evaluative in 
Hare's sense of making a statement regarding the appropriateness of a 
behavior in relationship to the behavior's properties. 
Getting back to Baier's analysis, a value judgment cannot be con-
firmed by a process of verification, unlike many factual judgments. 
Value judgments, according to Baier, must also go through a process of 
11 validation, 11 that is, the characteristic of goodness need to be shown 
to be the right or correct criteria. Baier is saying, then, that both 
verification and validation are two processes necessary in confirming 
that "X 11 judgment is a moral judgment. But Baier is involved in an 
infinite regress, at least as regards his "validation" hypothesis. The 
judgment that 11 X, Y and Z" are the proper criteria to make 11 M11 a moral 
judgment are themselves derived at through a value judgment which needs 
to be validated -- as with any criteria of validation one can dream up. 
Baier is aware of the problem when he notes: 
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•.. the proper criteria for evaluating cars, fountain pens, plyers 
and so on are determined by the purpose of the thing, activity or 
enterprise in question.77 
For Baier, then, the question "What should I do?" is equivalent to 
"What is the best thing to do? 11 This must be the case, he argues, 
because it would be contradictory to say 11 ! know X is the best thing to 
do" and sti 11 ask "What should I do?" The best action, then, is that 
action which is supported by the best reasons, what Baier refers to as 
"consideration-making beliefs." He writes: 
The fact that I have a reason for or against entering on the pro-
posed line of action does not entail that I ought or ought not to 
enter on it -- it merely presumptively implies it. That is to say, 
it might be taken to imply that I ought or ought not to enter on it 
unless, later on, in the weighing of considerations, I find some 
that are weightier than this one. In that case, the original pre-
sumptive implication has been rebutted.78 
l 
For Baier, the "consideration-making belief" has a certain univer-
sality -- for instance, if one performs X and finds it good, one has 
good reasons for doing X. These good reasons would be equally true for 
everyone in this particular situation. Baier tries to avoid ethical 
relativism by this move. A "consideration-making belief," then, is not 
synonymous with one's consideration. This is not a matter of the agent 
liking a particular consideration, nor a "consideration-making belief" 
being so because one likes it. 
77 Ibid., p. 80. 
78Ibid., p. 102. 
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Although Baier elaborates three different kinds of "consideration-
making beliefs, 11 individual rules, social rules and moral rules, his 
arguments need not detain us here. To develop the logic of Baier•s 
position, it is preferable to describe what he means by "the moral point 
of view, 11 then to analyze and critique his position. It is at this 
point that it becomes obvious that Baier rejects a pure formalist ap-
proach and argues that judgments are moral due to a consideration of 
content. Indeed the above discussion of "consideration-making beliefs" 
brings this out. Now, though, 11 consideration-making beliefs" need to be 
discussed within the context of "the moral point of view. 11 
For Baier, it is "the moral point of view" which determines wheth-
er a moral judgment is true or false; and it is a "consideration-making 
belief" which designates a judgment as moral, as opposed to, say, an 
aesthetic judgment. "The moral point of view, 11 then, is that of 11 an 
independent, unbiased, impartial, objective, dispassionate, disinterest-
ed observer . a God's-eye point of view. 1179 A judgment is moral, 
therefore, if it is based upon "the moral point of view, 11 that is if 
"the moral point of view" overrides all other considerations. 
At this point, though, Baier has not been very descriptive in 
analyzing "the· moral point of view. 11 He does claim that it has two 
79 Ibid., p. 201. 
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essential features: 1) To adopt "the moral point of view" is to adopt 
moral principles. Such principles as respect for life, say, are not 
merely individual rules. Rather, a moral principle, for Baier, does not 
admit of exceptions and it is considered to be universally binding. 2) 
The second feature of 11 the moral point of view 11 is that the principles 
it sanctions are for the good of everyone. When it comes to a social 
situation, then, Baier enumerates three conditions which, if enacted, 
demonstrate that a particular action is immoral: if the consequences of 
11 X" would be harmful if everyone did it; each member of the society is 
entitled to engage in it; and to engage in 11 X11 is an indulgence, never 
an altruistic act. 
What is confusing at this point is that the above three conditions 
are only valid, Baier seems to say, if society "Y" considers act 11 X" to 
be immora 1. Clearly, if this analysis of Baier's position is correct, 
one could always ask, 11 Why adopt the 11 moral point of view" when it is 
against my self-interest to do so?" The only defense Baier seems to have 
for adopting a moral point of view which, often, is in violation of 
one's self-interest is that if such a moral point of view is not adopted 
self-interest becomes the guiding ethical influence. And Baier, with 
his universalistic ethical tendencies, decries such a state of affairs. 
The very raison d'etre of a morality is to yield reasons which 
overrule the reasons of self-interest in those cases when everyone's 
following self interest would be harmful to everyone. Hence moral 
reasons are superior to all others.BO 
BOibid., p. 309. 
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Although it is reasonable to say an action ought to be done 
because there are reasons for doing it, if the reasons for doing 11 X11 
outweigh the reasons against doing 11 X, 11 Baier still hasn't argued why 
certain facts are reasons and other facts are not. Rather than 
clarifying this situation, Baier's analysis of "consideration-making 
beliefs" only adds another category for clarification. This means that 
Baier must use another category, "the moral point of view, 11 to account 
for the fact that moral judgments can be either true or false. He is, 
perhaps, like a painter who has painted herself into a corner: every 
possible way out becomes constricted by adding paint. Maybe due to the 
fact that Baier cannot (or has not) supply reasons why certain facts are 
reasons and other facts are not reasons, he cannot be convincing why one 
ought to adopt "the moral point of view" at all. Let us, then, examine 
this "moral point of view" characteristic in more detail -- for "the 
moral point of view" seems to be a characteristic of content. 
It is difficult to understand if "the moral point of view" refers 
to any point of view in particular, that is, if it is a view that IS 
actually held or one that OUGHT to be actually held. There is an impor-
tant difference here which has important ramifications for the idea that 
"the moral point of view" is a content-characteristic in defining a 
moral judgment or in distinguishing a moral judgment from other norma-
tive judgments. 
How can "the moral point of view" be a point of view actually held 
by anyone? It is actually the case that different people adopt a dif-
ferent moral point of view regarding abortion, say, so that if "the 
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moral point of view" has any standing it must be a point of view that 
OUGHT to be held, not one which actually IS held. Let us see if this 
alternative makes sense. 
To endorse such a theory as "the moral point of view" is the view 
that OUGHT to be adopted because it OUGHT to be adopted is (clearly) 
circular. Or even worse, for Baier to argue that "the moral point of 
view" has the standing of moral because it is the point of view that 
OUGHT to be adopted is contradictory to his theory. He has just argued 
that morality is not to be based on self-interest. 
But if "the moral point of view" is that point of view that OUGHT 
to be adopted, upon what basis other than self-interest OUGHT it to be 
adopted? Baier has not supplied any other basis, except to say that 
self-interest OUGHT not to be the guiding basis for ethical decision 
making. 
If the above is correct, it seems impossible to formulate a moral 
theory such that the defining characteristic of a moral judgment is that 
it is adopted within the confines of "the moral point of view." It 
seems clear, then, that Baier's criterion is found wanting; and this 
particular attempt at a content approach to defining and justifying 
moral judgments is incorrect. 
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Another attempt to develop extra-formalistic aspects (i.e., 
content-aspects) to answering the issue of the characteristics of moral 
judgments is that of Stephen Toulmin. Toulmin notes that to say 11 X is 
an ethical action" or 11 X is ethically appropriate" has little bearing on 
the nature of the action itself. Such assertions, he argues, do not 
intimate that actions 11 X, 11 11 Y, 11 or 11 Z11 possess a particular property. 
Rather, such assertions intimate that there are "good reasons" for doing 
11 X, 11 11 Y , 11 or 11 Z. 11 He writes: 
Rightness is not a property; and when I asked the two people which 
course was the right one I was not asking them about a property --
what I wanted to know was whether there was any reason for choosing 
one course of action rather than another; and, provided that they 
are arguing about the reasons for my doing different things, we are 
perfectly justified in talking of a genuine contradiction between N 
is right and No not N, but M. The idea (which the philosopher takes 
for granted) that, if one man attributes the predicate X to anything 
and another withholds it, they cannot be contradicting one another 
unless X stands at least for a property is a fallacy. All that two 
people need (and all that they have) to contradict one another about 
in the case of ethical predicates are the reasons for doing this 
rather than that or the other.81 
We need to, then, further elucidate what Toulmin means by "good 
reasons, 11 and to relate this to the nature of moral judgments. Hear-
th t th . 1 . . . . 82 th t gues a e ica reasoning is su1 gener1s, a is, it is neither 
inductive nor deductive. As he says: 
One point which the imperative doctrine fairly emphasizes is the 
difference between arguments from logical, mathematical or factual 
premises to conclusions of a similar logical type, and arguments 
81stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics. 
Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 28. 
(Cambridge: 
82 Ibid., p. 55. 
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from factual premises to conclusions of a different kind, conclu-
sions about duties or values ... Although factual reasons (R) may 
be good reasons for an ethical conclusion (E), to assert the conclu-
sion is not just to assert the reasons, or indeed anything of the 
same logical type as R. It is to declare that one ought to approve 
of, or pursue, or do something-or-other.83 
For Toulmin a "good reason" to label a judgment (or an action) 
ethical goes well beyond logic. Toulmin wants to consider broad philo-
sophical issues, such as "What is the purpose of ethics in human 
conduct?" Like many philosophers before him, Toulmin sees ethics as 
tied in an integral way to the harmonious development of community life. 
Duty itself, he notes, is a communal concept in that we alter our claims 
because they conflict with the justified claims of others -- or because 
adhering to our claims might negatively affect communal life. 84 
Some moral judgments, such as "One should keep promises," are 
moral precisely because promise keeping is tied to the harmonious living 
out of community 1 ife. Thus if one is asked "Why did you keep your 
promise?" and she were to answer, "Because I ought to," such an answer 
would be ethical justification for keeping promises -- that is, it is a 
socially recognized principle that promises ought to be kept. Indeed if 
they were not, community life would be intolerable. 
For the sake of argument, let us agree with Toulmin. There is no 
great philosophical difficulty with his position so far -- and who would 
suggest that promises ought not to be kept? Or who would argue that 
promise keeping is integral to harmonious community living? All of this 
83 Ibid., p. 55. 
84 Ibid., pp. 133-136. 
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may be a truism and not exactly philosophically important (although 
socially necessary). Yet Toulmin realizes that promise keeping is a 
clear case of social priority. What about cases in which there are 
conflicts of duty? About these Toulmin remarks: 
... one has to weigh up, as well as one can, the risks involved in 
ignoring either, and choose 'the lesser of two evils.' Appeal to a 
single current principle, through the primary test of the rightness 
of an action, cannot therefore be relied on as a universal test; 
where this fails, we are driven back upon our estimate of the proba-
ble consequences.85 
Although the above quote makes imminently good sense (and we will 
attempt to develop an ethical model which integrates the various aspects 
of a moral judgment later), we must note what Toulmin is not saying. He 
is not suggesting that one always ought to follow conventional or com-
munity morality. To say this would contradict the above quote. Rather, 
to ask "Is X moral"? is really synonymous to asking "Is X within the 
particular moral code I subscribe to?" To ask, "Is X moral?" is not to 
ask "Is X conventionally adhered to?" The answer to "Is X moral?" is 
not so much society's answer, but it is the answer of an individual who 
adopts a particular moral scheme, albeit this particular society's moral 
scheme. 
Yet, if the above is a correct interpretation of Toulmin's 
thoughts, there is a feeling of uneasiness here. For instance, Toulmin 
continues: 
85 Ibid., p. 147. 
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Within the framework of a particular scientific theory, one can ask 
of most things, 'Is this really straight?', but the criterion of 
straightness cannot be questioned; within the framework of a par-
ticular moral code, one can ask of most individual actions, 'Is this 
really right?,' but the standards of rightness cannot be ques-
tioned.86 
Surely this is false. Even within science itself basic standards are 
questioned. Isn't this questioning the basis of scientific revolutions? 
The application of morality itself changes -- or our moral judgments are 
broadened -- precisely by questioning our moral standards. Recent phil-
osophical work, say by Peter Singer, on animal rights is an example of 
the questioning of moral standards, of the interpretation of moral stan-
dards. To give but one more example, slavery was an accepted practice, 
even within the framework of early Christianity. St. Paul tells slaves 
to obey their masters. But by questioning the moral standards which 
applied to treatment of people, and by expanding the concept of person 
to include slaves, perhaps, Western culture began to think differently 
about the morality of slavery. 
Morality is different than mathematics in that morality clearly is 
not a totally deductive system (mathematics may not be either, for that 
matter, although Euclidian geometry is as close as we can get, perhaps). 
Even though Toulmin claims the contrary, he is viewing morality as a set 
of axioms, called moral standards, that are true because of their rela-
tionships within a system, called morality. And this is deduction. 
Rather, morality, as we will argue later, is much more wholistic than 
86 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
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this and much more ambiguous and complicated. As we argue in other 
places in this Dissertation, without commitment morality does not make 
sense. It is this sense of commitment which Toulmin begins to get at in 
his remarks about moral conflict, but even here his 11 weighing up 11 smacks 
too much of a mathematics of morality. 
It is obvious that Toulmin thinks that moral judgments are of two 
sorts: 1) Those whose answers are unequivocal, for they are demanded by 
the accepted moral code one extra-formalistic or content-aspect to 
moral judgment making; and 2) those moral judgments which can only be 
analyzed in light of an assessment of probable consequences, a second 
content-aspect to moral judgments. Category 1 has such few candidates, 
promise keeping being the paradigm case, that it is difficult to see how 
Toulmin is saying anything philosophically important. Category 2 is 
where the ethical action is. In summarizing his view Toulmin writes: 
An action which is an unambiguous instance of a maxim generally 
accepted in the community concerned ... will be right just because 
it is an instance of such a maxim: but if it is an action over 
which there is a conflict of duties, or is itself a principle (or 
social practice) as opposed to a particular action, it will be right 
or wrong according as its consequences are likely to be good or 
bad.87 
It seems that Toulmin is involved in a number of confusions. 
1) A moral principle and a social practice are not synonymous. In 
fact, they may have no bearing on each other. If one makes the distinc-
tion between practices and institutions Macintyre does, for instance, 
practices, such as playing a game of football, are involved in using 
87 lbi d.' 134. 
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principles by which to assess behavior (face mask violations are wrong 
because of the injury they can afford the player). The institution of 
football, the NFL, for instance, may or may not have positive moral 
bearing on the game -- although we tend to believe it does act in the 
interest of the players. It may, say during a merger, act solely in its 
own self-interest, as a social practice does. At any rate, to collapse 
the distinction between moral principles and social practices certainly 
is bad philosophy. 
2) Toulmin's concept of "good reasons," an extra-formalistic 
approach to moral judgment making, itself is ambiguous. He is never 
clear if "good reasons" are justifications for saying "X is right" or 
for saying "X ought to be done." Put differently, are "good reasons" 
reasons for doing "X" or merely reasons for asserting that "X" ought to 
be done? Toulmin has not clarified which. 
The above criticisms may make one suspicious about the relevance 
of "good reasons" as the characteristic for making sense of the nature 
of moral judgments. But the issue is more complicated than this. 
Toulmin further confuses things by asserting: 
We must give up the traditional oblique approach of asking, first, 
What is goodness? and What is rightness? and attack our central 
problem from scratch ... We shall have to go right back to the 
beginning, to the first form in which we asked our question: What 
kinds of argument, of reasoning, is it proper for us to accept in 
support of moral decisions?88 
This complicates the issue because Toulmin is begging the very 
question he is attempting to answer. As was mentioned before, 
88 Ib1·d., 63 64 pp. - . 
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argumentation within mathematics (in many instances) is deductive. The 
method of moral reasoning is not. Philosophers do not even agree about 
what constitutes a valid moral judgment (if they did this Dissertation 
would not be necessary) -- much less on appropriate moral argumentation. 
Since this is the case, Toulmin can never develop criteria of moral 
reasoning ("good reasons") before there is some consensus regarding what 
constitutes a valid or invalid argument in morality. At the very least, 
he is putting the cart before the horse. 
A final difficulty with Toulmin's content-approach to moral judg-
ment making is that he argues that the validity of moral judgment making 
only makes sense within the framework of community life. As he argues: 
The only context in which the concept of duty is straightforwardly 
intelligible is one of communal life -- it is, indeed, completely 
bound up with this very feature of communal life, that we learn to 
renounce our claims and alter our aims where they conflict with 
those of our fellows .... And we can fairly characterize ethics as 
a part of the process whereby the desires and actions of the members 
of a community are harmonized.89 
Toulmin is involved in a logical error in the sense that before he 
can validly argue that 11 X is moral" makes sense, if and only if, it 
leads to community harmonization (a content-aspect of moral judgment 
making), he must argue that this very principle, namely 11 X is moral, if 
and only if, it leads to community harmonization," itself is part of a 
community's moral code. But it can't be. If it were, Toulmin would, 
89 rbid., p. 133 and 136. 
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again, be begging the question. He would be saying in effect that one 
ought to obey the community's moral code because there is a principle in 
the community's moral code which says that one ought to obey the commun-
ity's moral code. 
Toulmin supposes that his argument that the function of moral dis-
course is to lead to harmonization of interests is a logical thesis. G. 
Warnock insists that this is not the case. He says: 
. it was either an empirical generalization about the aims which 
people in fact often pursue when they use moral language, or it was 
itself a moral recommendation.90 
Part of the reason for this confusion is that Toulmin views sci-
ence and ethics as proceeding along the same lines, that is, they both 
translate reports of what seems to be the case to what is the case. As 
Toulmin writes: 
In both, one encounters a contrast between the 'appearance' and the 
'reality' the scientist distinguishing between the 'apparent' 
colour of the sun and its 'real' colour ... the moralist distin-
guishing those things which are 'really' good, and those actions 
which are 'really' right, from those things which we simply like and 
those actions we simply feel like doing.91 
One problem with this view is that it assumes that both science 
and ethics start with "incorrigible direct reports" and eventually 
replaces these with "fully fledged judgments" which are "far from incor-
rigible.1192 As Warnock argues, the assertion "This looks obligatory," 
90warnock, Contem~ora ry__ Moral Philoso~hy__, p. 127. 
91T 1 . ou min, The Place of Reason in Ethics, pp. 84-85. 
92warnock, Contem~ora ry__ Moral Phi 1 oso~hY.., p. 133. 
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using the model of 11 This looks red, 11 does not make sense. 93 Ethical 
assertions and scientific ones simply do not share the characteristics 
Toulmin imagines. 
But an even more telling criticism of Toulmin's theory is that it 
eventuates in an 11 absurdity. 1194 It is one thing to claim that moral 
reasoning has practical import; it is another to argue that 11 it 
influences people to one and only one purpose -- namely, to the purpose 
of harmonizing their interests. 1195 
In actual practice people use moral terms in ways other than with 
the intent to harmonize interests. In fact, at times moral terms are 
used to create conflict which may or may not lead to any sort of har-
mony of interests. As Warnock argues: 
The principle of social harmony points only to one set of possible 
moral standards or criteria for applying terms like 'good,' 'right,' 
or 'ought'. To say that the purpose of moral discourse is to serve 
social harmony is thus itself a proposal or recommendation to adopt 
one set of moral standards among alternative ones.96 
It seems, then, that content explanations for determining the 
nature of moral judgments fail because they often beg the very question 
they are attempting to answer, that is, when an extra-formalistic cri-
terion is brought into the mora 1 picture (be it 11 good reasons, 11 
consequences, or whatever) the extra-formalistic criterion itself needs 
93 Ibid.' p. 134. 
94 Ibi d. ' p. 136. 
95 Ibid., p. 136. 
96 Ibid., p. 136. 
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justification. And, if Toulmin and Baier are representative of the 
content approach to moral judgment making, the very content they suggest 
is part of their conclusion when it needs to be part of the premise of 
their argument. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE VIRTUE ETHICS APPROACH 
A third theory elaborating the characteristics of a moral judgment 
is the virtue ethics approach. The work of Alasdair Macintyre is note-
worthy in the recent development of this approach. Although this theory 
is more complex than the other two we previously investigated, we want 
to argue that it holds the most promise for answering the question: 
What characteristics make a judgment moral? But, as will be argued, the 
virtues approach by itself has severe philosophical flaws. Thus, a more 
eclectic approach to answering the question of this Dissertation will be 
offered. 
The virtue ethics approach goes back to the work of Aristotle. 
Such an ethic attempts to define the ends of human life and to enumerate 
the characteristics which constitute a "good person. 1197 The argument is 
that once the nature of human virtues is discovered, then the living of 
the good life is the living out of the virtues -- the end of human life 
and the good life for humans, then, become synonymous. 
97This point is developed in Samuel Enoch Stumpf 1 s PhilosoJhy: 
History and Problems. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983 , pp. 
78-104. 
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Virtue, therefore, is the disposition to act on principles of 
right conduct. Virtue becomes that which a good person does. One such 
delineation is offered by Macintyre. He offers a definition of virtue, 
although he refers to his definition as "partial and tentative. 1198 He 
writes: 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of 
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal 
to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from 
achieving any such goods.99 
Inherent in Macintyre's definition of virtue is the distinction 
between goods external to and internal to practices. This distinction 
is in need of clarification. To illustrate the distinction Macintyre 
offers the example of the child, the candy and chess: 
Consider the example of a highly intelligent seven-year-old child 
whom I want to teach to play chess, although the child has no par-
ticular desire to learn the game. The child does however have a 
very strong desire for candy and little chance of obtaining it. I 
therefore tell the child that if the child will play chess with me 
once a week I will give the child 50 cents worth of candy •.. 
Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win . • so we may 
hope, there will come a time when the child will find in those goods 
specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular 
kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive 
intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on 
a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the 
game of chess demands.100 
98Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue. (Notre Dame, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 178. 
Indiana: 
99 Ibid., p. 178. 
lOOibid., p. 178. 
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Such goods as analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive 
intensity are, for Macintyre, goods internal to the practice. He 
defines a practice in rather broad terms: 
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules 
as well as the achievement of goods.101 
Macintyre, then, wants to maintain a particular logical process of 
prioritization in understanding and articulating virtue. The process is 
initiated by determining what is valuable, that is, the values internal 
to practice. Once this is accomplished, one can determine which quali-
ties are virtues and which are vices. This is still rather vague, but 
Macintyre attempts to clear things up by suggesting that it is the par-
ticular satisfactions of engaging in practices that set off those quali-
ties that are virtues from those that are vices. 102 
What makes Macintyre 1 s position a bit muddled is that he also 
wants to maintain values external to the practice are also part and par-
1 f 1 . h 1 h d . . 103 p h th ce o va u1ng, sue as wea t an recogn1t1on. er aps e more 
primitive a society was, the closer tie there would be between values 
internal to practice and values external to practice the reason being 
that in such a society life would consist almost entirely of practices, 
practices the members all agreed upon and all participated in to some 
extent. Perhaps, though, as Edmund Pincoffs suggests, 11 the issue . 
lOlibid., p. 176. 
l02Ibid., p. 177. 
l03Ibid., p. 180. 
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whether internal or external values are most worth cultivating is irrel-
evant here. 11104 
Perhaps the issue here is misplaced. Instead of asking about the 
import and status of values internal or external to practice, the real 
issue is with competition among values, not complementary values. As 
Clinton Collins suggests: 
It seems to me that the different sources of value in human lives 
lead not, as Macintyre assumes, to complementary values but rather 
to competing values ... He does not, however, consider the possi-
bility that the objectivity of virtues is in no way a guarantee 
against their being in conflict with one another.105 
One may wonder if in the quest to conceive life as a unity, part of 
Macintyre's Aristotelian project, he is short sided regarding the nature 
of human life, that is, the competition of values in one's life -- the 
need for value prioritization. 
It is clear that Macintyre is attempting to find an objective 
basis of ethics. Indeed he laments the fact, as he understands it, that 
contemporary thought has so tied virtue to subjectivity that any possi-
bility of objective value is lost. This is inherent in his critique of 
emotivism. It is this proposed (or sought after) objective basis of 
104Edward Pincoffs, 11 Definition of the Virtues, 11 Virtues and Med-
1c1ne: Ex lorations in the Character of Medicine, Ed. Earl Shelp. 
Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985 , p. 125. 
105Clinton Collins, "Before Virtue: A Critique of the New Essen-
tialism in Ethics and Education, 11 Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual 
Meetin of the Philoso h of Education Societ , Ed. Emily Robertson. 
Normal, Illinois: Illinois State University, 1985), p. 210. 
71 
ethics which gives unity to a person's participation in the common prac-
tices of the culture. 106 
The basis Macintyre is looking for he discovers in the narrative 
unity of a human life which is transmitted in the telling of stories. 107 
It is the narrative unity of one's life, then, which is the criterion of 
the worthiness of one's practices. Note, however, that in none of 
Macintyre's arguments does he argue for the objectivity of virtue. Nor 
does he argue that when certainty regarding value is found, so will 
objectivity be discovered. Almost like a Cartesian he assumes that 
certainty is equivalent to objectivity. Macintyre, then, assumes the 
unity of narrative with practice -- or in the language we have been 
using throughout this Dissertation, the unity of form and content. 
For Macintyre, the unity of a person's life is embodied in "the 
unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. 11108 It follows that the 
good life for an individual consists in the systematic living out of 
that unity. As much appeal as Macintyre's theory might have (Who would 
not like to think of their life as embodying unity? To view one's life 
as fragmented certainly is less than desirable), Kai Nielsen notes some 
difficulties with Macintyre's position. In the first place, one could 
be kind, decent and understanding, one's life could be unified by such a 
106Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 203. 
l07 Ibid., p. 114. 
l08 Ibid., p. 203. 
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narrative and "still be a lost human being utterly astray in Eliot's 
Wasteland. 11109 Secondly, there are numerous individuals whom most of us 
would describe as having lived a life unified by value, but by a value 
we find despicable, such as Hitler. Nielsen continues: 
One's life can be through and through evil and still have such a 
unity and it could, in certain respects, be a good life and lack 
that unity.110 
Likewise, one still wonders what criteria Macintyre would give for 
success or failure in living out one's narrative. One is never sure if 
one's life is being proportioned appropriately. I feel, for instance, 
that since my wife recently had a baby I need to travel less and be at 
home more. Does this mean that I'm presently not successfully living 
out the unity which is my narrative? If I attempt to travel less I will 
not earn the proper amount of money to support my baby in a way my wife 
and I feel is necessary. How do I know when my life is in balance? 
Macintyre does say that "the only criteria for success or failure in a 
human life as a whole are the criteria of success or failure in a nar-
rated or to-be-narrated quest. 11111 But this begs the question of the 
109Kai Nielsen, "Critique of Pure Virtue: Animadversions on a 
Virtue-Based Ethic," Virtue and Medicine, p. 139. 
llO Ibid., 139. 
111Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 203. 
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very criteria which would do the job. That there must be criteria is 
certain. That Macintyre has not supplied any is also certain. 
Likewise, Macintyre certainly has offered a definition of the 
good. But he still hasn't given instances of it: he hasn't said what 
it is. He does write: 
. those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and 
enable us to achieve goods internal to practices, but which will 
also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by 
enabling us to overcome the human dangers and distractions we 
encounter ... 112 
All this is well and good -- and the above might even be a true charac-
terization of the good -- but it is hardly a hint at what a person's 
final end is. Macintyre continues: 
We have arrived at a provisional conclusion about the good life for 
man: the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good 
life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those 
which will enable us to understand what more and what less the good 
life for man is.113 
Is Macintyre saying that the good is beyond grasp, that the quest is all 
there is? Without some knowledge of what the destination is, how does 
one know which train to catch? Macintyre, then, has not delivered the 
ethical goods. Surely he has correctly diagnosed the serious destruc-
tion of the objectivity of ethics. Surely he has offered wisdom regard-
ing the processes in life which indicate our need to unify our lives. 
112 Ibid., p. 204. 
113 Ibid., p. 204. 
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lives. And surely he has helped us understand the relationship between 
moral tradition and social/political practices. But before one can 
begin to address the question of this Dissertation: What are the 
characteristics of a moral judgment (What makes a judgment moral?), one 
needs to know more than Macintyre offers. If a judgment is moral 
because it is in conformity with the good, one needs to know what the 
good is and that good needs to have universalizability. If Macintyre 
is correct, as he may not be, when he notes that much of one's moral 
life consists of choosing between types of evil, it seems to be impos-
sible to engage in the task of choice if there is no good by which to 
measure which degree or aspect of evil to comply with. It is for all 
the above reasons that, no matter how insightful Macintyre 1 s theory may 
be, Macintyre 1 s brand of virtue ethics is not helpful in answering our 
question. His analysis gets us to the verge of an answer without giving 
it. To merely supply a process of attainment leaves much to be desired. 
The following is a clear example of Macintyre 1 s logic: supplying 
reasons why knowing one's telos in life is essential without indicating 
what that good is: 
I have suggested so far that unless there is a telos which trans-
cends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of a 
whole human life, the good of a human life conceived as a unity, it 
will both be the case that a certain subversive arbitrariness will 
invade the moral life and that we shall be unable to specify the 
context of certain virtues adequately.114 
114Ibid., p. 189. 
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The sense and seriousness of this sentence can easily be appreciated. 
But Macintyre begs the question of the nature of that telos by remarking 
(again with high seriousness and sense): 
... there is at least one virtue recognized by the tradition which 
cannot be specified at all except with reference to the wholeness of 
a human life -- the virtue of integrity or constancy.115 
Is the virtue of integrity or constancy synonymous with one's telos? At 
times Macintyre seems to be suggesting this. And if this is the case, 
the question of this Dissertation makes little sense in a Macintyrian 
moral universe -- for the end cannot be specified except in reference to 
something else, integrity or constancy. But to add, "This notion of 
singleness of purpose in a whole life can have no application unless 
that of a whole life does, 11 adds poetry and mysticism, but hardly 
clarity. Again, we may be looking in the wrong place for the clarity 
needed to answer, 11 What makes a judgment moral?" If it exhibits 
singleness of purpose in a whole life may be some kind of answer, but 
one that needs more fleshing out than Macintyre affords. 
115 Ibid., p. 189. 
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A final view of virtue ethics we will examine in some detail is 
that of James Wallace. 116 Wallace views the virtues as integral to 
appropriate human moral behavior, that is, the living out of the moral 
virtues (which, as Philippa Foot notes, contra Aristotle, need to be 
separated from the aesthetic virtues, say) 117 is the single most factor 
which contributes to human good. As Wallace writes: 
Particular virtues perform certain functions, play certain roles, in 
human life. A great number of factors in many different ways con-
tribute systematically to human good, and virtues in specifiable 
ways so contribute ... 118 
According to Wallace, then, ethics is a practical subject, what 
today is called 11 applied ethics. 11 It is ethics, on this view, which 
orders human conduct -- within the family, one's business, or the larger 
community, for instance. Since the development and living out of vir-
tues is the sine -9.!:@. non of the moral life, for Wallace, humans are to 
be characterized as possessing certain (proper) capacities and tenden-
cies. Thus: 
We can conceive of the creature's good as the unimpaired exercise of 
these capacities. Thus, an individual's living well or badly will 
be a matter of its relative success in carrying on these activities. 
To understand what success in these activities is, one must under-
stand the activities.119 
116James Wallace, 
University Press, 1978). 
Virtues and Vices. (Ithaca, NY: Cornel 1 
117Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices, 11 Virtues and Vices and Other 
Essa)s in Moral Philosophy. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978 Chapter One. 
118James Wallace, Virtues and Vices, p. 15. 
119 Ibid., p. 26. 
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This view seems to be at odds with the notion that certain uni-
versal traits or tendencies issue in specific virtuous acts. Although 
there is an evident theoretical difficulty here, Wallace contradicts 
himself when he admits: 
Our notion of a human being living well is bound up with a multi-
plicity of complicated moral and social values. There is an obvious 
conventional aspect to these matters, and therefore conceptions of 
the good life have varied so from time to time and from community to 
community. Human health may be studied as one studies the health of 
other living creatures, but the idea of a human being's living well, 
in the full sense, is so bound up with conventional values, that its 
study must be very different from the study of other living 
things.120 
Now it may be true that 11 certain conventions will be better than 
others for a given community in a certain situation. 11121 But if virtue 
is as closely tied to conventional values and behavior as Wallace ar-
gues, his brand of virtue theory is philosophically problematic. To 
follow convention may (or may not) lead to the building of community 
but at the sacrifice of certain members of that community who disagree 
with its "virtue conventions." Or, one could follow the "virtue conven-
tions" of an oppressive community only to find the community secure, 
while citizens are in constant danger if they disagree with "convention-
al virtue." Put differently, "convention" is an ambiguous concept; and 
fallowing convention is not synonymous with developing personal vir-
t 122 ue. If this is what Wallace means by "living the good life," his 
120Ibid., p. 33. 
121 Ibid., p. 36. 
122The work of Lawrence Kohlberg, which we have previously 
viewed, is a position contradictory to Wallace's. 
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concept of such a virtuous life is indeed limiting and questionable. 
Using Wallace's "virtue ethics," then, leads to a fixed idea of 
virtue. This is implied when he writes that "only if individuals have 
certain fairly fixed traits of character can they live successfully 
.
11123 There i·s no f th · · t · thi"s th room or grow in vir ue given eory. It 
is as if Wallace does not seem to realize that the virtuous life is one 
in which ethical conflicts are the pattern of the day. And in ethically 
conflicting situations virtues are not enough, for both virtues and eth-
ical principles need to be prioritized if the virtuous life is to be 
led. The point is that moral judgments cannot even be made if virtue is 
fixed within the individual. Morality itself becomes mechanized and 
routine -- certainly not "the life worth living" with its tragedies, 
complexities and conflicts. 
Rather than viewing ethical judgments within the context of virtue 
ethics, this writer would take another road. It can be argued that par-
ticular events take on additional significance from their contexts. A 
note played by itself has a particular sound. The same note with the 
same sound heard as part of a melody has an additional significance. It 
is heard not in isolation but in relation to the notes which come before 
and those which come after. 
In a similar way many human actions gain an additional signifi-
cance from their context. The act of shaking hands has one significance 
123James Wallace, Virtues and Vices, p. 160. 
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when old friends meet, another significance when strangers are intro-
duced, and still another significance when two people who have quarreled 
are reconciled. To point out another's mistake has one sort of signifi-
cance when it is done to tease a friend, a different significance when a 
devoted teacher helps a student, and a third kind of significance when 
it is done out of spite. Clearly, one cannot judge whether an act is 
good, nor the extent to which it is good, if one does not grasp the 
contexts which give additional meaning to the act a fact to which 
Wallace seems oblivious. 
One important context arises from the fact that doing things of a 
particular kind makes one a particular kind of person -- extending vir-
tue ethics in this sense. If one frequently tells lies, for instance, 
one constitutes herself as a dishonest person. Once she realizes that 
this is so there is a new dimension added to her choice about whether or 
not to tell the truth. One becomes responsible not only for the partic-
ular good or bad things one causes outside of herself by her choice. 
She becomes responsible for the kind of person she is and will become. 
At this point she can put more of herself into a moral judgment. 
One chooses one or another alternative not only because of its quality 
in itself but also because one chooses to become a particular kind of 
person. In this way, one may choose to be loyal to a friend not only 
because of what it does for one's friend, but also because one wills to 
be the kind of person who is loyal to friends. It is this concept of 
willing which is absent from virtue ethics. 
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In commenting on virtue ethics, Philippa Foot views the virtues as 
"correctives to vices. 11124 This view also has built into it a rigid 
notion of virtue, as well as a questionable philosophy of human nature, 
that is, humans are viewed with suspicion, as opposed to being viewed 
with trust. Foot is certainly not a romantic. Yet in her "Are Moral 
Considerations Overriding?" she argues that they are not. She says: 
It seems then that the thesis that evidential moral considerations 
are invariably taken (by anyone who cares about morality) as more 
important than other considerations is simply false. The thesis 
that verdictive moral considerations are invariably taken as more 
important than other considerations is also false.125 
Without developing her reasons for this conclusion (and without 
examining the difference between evidential and verdictive moral con-
siderations), the reason Foot is correct is that moral judgments appear 
in contexts of the sort we have previously suggested. It is no credit 
to virtue ethics, then, to not have noticed this, nor to have minimized 
the place of human will in making moral judgments. 
Let us examine virtue ethics from another perspective that of 
Bernard Williams. For Williams, it is not the virtue habits one has 
which are the primary factors in understanding the nature of moral judg-
ments, it is an examination of one's projects, or what we referred to 
124Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, Chapter One. 
125Philippa Foot, "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?" Virtues 
and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, p. 187. 
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as contexts earlier. 126 Williams uses various synonyms for project in 
his work, such as "desire," "concern" and "commitment. 11127 And, proj-
ects can be of a variety of sorts -- from a concern with basic survival 
to religious commitment, say. Williams refers to the latter sorts of 
projects as "ground projects," and under this category he includes 
artistic interests and strongly held moral convictions. 
It is the projects in one's life, for Williams, which "help to 
constitute a character. 11128 That is, it is one's projects which morally 
(and in other ways) set her apart from others -- demonstrate her unique-
ness and individuality, an exactly different philosophical emphasis than 
Wallace's, say, with his emphasis on convention and uniformity. And it 
is precisely these "ground projects" which define someone as a human 
person, for they persist over time. 
One value which Williams holds strongly to is 11 integrity. 11129 For 
him it is integrity which indicates human wholeness and a commitment to 
living out one's moral commitments. Any moral philosophy, then, which 
126J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitari-
anism," Utilitarianism: For and Against. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), pp. 110-112 and Bernard Williams, "Persons, 
Character and Morality," The Identities of Persons, Ed. Amelle Rorty. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 201. 
127Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality, p. 201. 
128see especially, Berna rd Willi ams, "Mora 1 Luck, 11 Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. L, 1976, pp. 115-135. 
129 Ibid., pp. 118-125. 
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views impartiality as a primary moral value in moral judgment making is 
suspect, given Williams' position. Let us examine why this is so. 
In certain consequentialist ethical theories, for example, it is 
necessary for the human moral agent to predict the consequences, total 
social happiness, say, which would result from acting on particular 
moral judgments. This view is problematical because it is assuming that 
one's personal happiness (or misery, for that matter) is on the same 
footing with everyone else's. Clearly this is incorrect. One's 
commitments and scruples play an essential part in one's moral judgment 
making, and if the view we have described above were true, there would 
be no room for moral commitment. Put in practical terms, one's commit-
ment to one's child, say, and not the expansion of social happiness for 
all, is at the heart of one's moral judgment making. Put differently, 
one does not kill one's child to increase the general happiness of soci-
ety because one is committed to the child the child takes precedence 
to increasing social happiness. It is simply not true that each 
person's concerns are on an equal footing with everyone else's -- a 
position which the formalist impartiality theories leads one to. 
Wi 11 i ams writes: 
Instead of thinking in a rational and systematic way either about 
utilities or the value of human life, the relevance of the people at 
risk being present, and so forth, the presence of the people at risk 
may just have its effect ... for most human purposes (sub specie 
aeternitatis) is not a good species to view the world under ... 
very often we just act as a possibly confused result of the situa-
tion in which we are engaged. That, I suspect, is very often an 
exceedingly good thing.130 
130sernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," p. 118. 
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What we find in Williams• moral philosophy, then, is an attack on 
all three of the philosophical positions we are examining in this 
Dissertation. It is an attack on all three for the same reason, namely 
they do not recognize the place of commitment in making moral judgments. 
Formalism, with its views of impartiality and universalizability, has 
abstraction in moral reasoning taking precedence over moral commitment. 
In content theories, such as various brands of utilitarianism, social 
happiness takes precedence over one's moral commitments. And virtue 
ethics is suspect because there is seemingly no room for moral commit-
ment within its theoretical geography. 
CHAPTER V 
MODELS OF MORAL JUDGMENT MAKING 
What we will attempt to do is to develop various philosophical 
models of moral judgment making based on elements 
discussed and analyzed in this Dissertation. 
of moral judgments 
The attempt, after 
reviewing several prospective models, will be to develop an "integrated 
model" of moral judgment making -- one which responds to the defects 
found in the various ethical perspectives explicated in the Disserta-
tion. 
It is recognized that there has been much philosophical ink spilled 
over analyzing and explicating the differences between a theory and a 
model. It is also recognized that there is not complete agreement 
within the philosophical community over what constitutes a theory, the 
relationship between facts and theory construction, or the precise 
differences among various types of theories, to name a few issues. 
Even though this is the case, it is necessary to supply a few 
remarks explicating why the term "model" is being used in this chapter. 
To delve into an extensive philosophical examination on the nature of 
theory or model construction is beyond the limits of this Dissertation. 
The term "model," though, is being used in the sense of a design which 
is held before one for guidance. A model is a heuristic device -- the 
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details are filled in when a particular issue is presented whose articu-
lation, illumination or resolution can be benefitted by viewing the 
issue through the particular model. 
It is certainly the case that the models to be presented are com-
prised of various theories. And to define 11 model 11 in the above manner 
suggests a particular theory of model building. But the term 11 theory, 11 
as being used in this Dissertation, differs from a model in that a 
theory is a more elaborate set of general or abstract concepts and 
principles which are useful when reflecting on the characteristics of 
moral judgments. A theory consists of a set(s) of propositions .linked 
together in various ways. A theory is an abstract, consistent perspec-
tive by which to view moral judgments, for instance. 
A model, on the other hand, is more heuristic. A teleological 
model, for instance, is a device for illuminating and resolving a 
particular moral dilemma which would benefit from analysis through the 
steps of the model. Teleology as a theory, though, is an elaborately 
worked out system or perspective on moral judgment making, among other 
areas. With this distinction in mind, let us proceed in the task of 
illustrating and explicating the various models of moral judgment mak-
ing. 
The philosophical justification for this move is twofold: 1) We 
have shown that the three major contenders for assessing the nature of 
what constitutes a moral judgment are philosophically inadequate and 
suspect; and 2) there is no logical reason why the various approaches to 
moral judgment making cannot (in principle) be combined. It is fully 
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realized that eclecticism in philosophy is viewed with suspicion -- as 
being intellectually bankrupt. So this move needs to be philosophically 
justified, to be argued for. 
We are assuming that the main question of this Dissertation, 11 What 
are the characteristics of a moral judgment?" is synonymous with the 
question 11 What is the nature of a mora 1 judgment?, 11 which is a 1 so 
synonymous with the question 11 What is the nature of moral judgment mak-
ing? 11 Undoubtedly some genius could take this assumption apart, but it 
is the basis of the entire Dissertation. If it is found that these are 
three separate or different questions, the Dissertation does not have a 
foundation to stand on. Thus, we are arguing that the attempt to develop 
an "integrative model" of moral judgment making is not a different 
enterprise from trying to ascertain what the characteristics of a moral 
judgment are. At the very least these three questions are so inter-
related as to be indistinguishable. 
William K. Frankena has argued that if one is viewing morality from 
a duty-perspective, it is virtue that is dependent on a duty-based 
account of ethical judgment. 131 Frankena, unlike Macintyre, gives 
priority to duty. Philippa Foot retorts to such views as Frankena's by 
noting: 
131wi 11 i am K. Frankena, "The Concept of Mora 1ity, 11 Perspectives on 
Morality: Essays of William K. Frankena, Ed. Kenneth Goodpaster (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), pp. 125-132. 
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The man who acts charitably out of a sense of duty is not to be 
undervalued, but . it is the spontaneous contributor who most shows 
virtue and therefore to the other that most moral worth is attrib-
uted.132 
Using different terms than we have in the Dissertation, why cannot 
a rights theory of ethical judgment (a content approach), a virtue based 
theory and a duty based theory (formalism) be combined in a philosophi-
cally creative and acceptable manner? If not, each theory seems to 
stand apart from the others; to have no relationship with the others; to 
even be mutually exclusive. One winds up, in the final analysis, with a 
Wittgensteinian moral universe where the rules (and so on) even within 
one area of ethical discourse do not translate to other areas of ethical 
discourse: an ethical world of moral monads, perhaps at best merely 
bumping into one another. 
Based on the work of Tom Beauchamp, 133 then, the following will be 
an attempt at such an integration, with the intent of developing various 
models of moral judgment making (with philosophical rationale) which 
will, in the final arguments of this chapter, lead to an 11 integrated 
model 11 of moral judgment making. Beauchamp writes: 
I am not contending that actions are virtues or that virtue stan-
dards are logically equivalent to moral principles. But I am 
maintaining the following: principle and virtue standards are both 
132Philippa Foot, 11 Virtue and Vices, 11 Virtues and Vices and Other 
Essa}s in Moral Philosophy. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978 ' p. 18. 
133Tom Beauchamp, 11 What 1 s So Special About the Virtues? 11 , Virtues 
and Medicine: Ex lorations in the Character of Medicine, Ed. Earl 
Shelp.. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985 , p. 307. 
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like general action guides; virtues in the context of ordinary 
morality are dispositions to do what persons ought to do as a matter 
of duty and principles of duty express our convictions about the 
proper character that persons should cultivate.134 
What Beauchamp contends is that every principle of duty has a 
corresponding virtue: for instance, fidelity corresponds to faithful-
ness; beneficence to benevolence. In a similar fashion he argues that 
rights, duties and virtues are correlative. He notes that 11 one person's 
right entails the duty of another to refrain from interfering or to 
provide some benefit, and any duty similarly entails a right. 11135 
To give but one example: respect for privacy is a principle of 
duty which correlates to respectfulness for privacy, which is a virtue 
standard, and guarantees the right of privacy, a human right. The 
general claim being made, then, is that virtues, principles and rights 
are correlative because they are all ends of the moral life. At times, 
to guarantee the moral life will be lived well, a theory of duty may be 
superior to a virtue standard -- at other times this may not be the 
case. Beauchamp and Childress put the point this way: 
Whether one takes the utilitarian or deontological standpoint no 
doubt makes a great deal of difference at many points in the moral 
life and in moral reflection and justification. Nevertheless, the 
differences can easily be overemphasized. In fact, we find that 
many (not all) forms of rule utilitarianism and rule deontology lead 
to identical rules and actions. It is possible from both 
134 Ibid., p. 311. 
135 Ibid., p. 311. 
89 
utilitarian and deontological standpoints to defend the same rules 
(such as truth telling and confidentiality) and to assign them 
roughly the same weight.136 
The point, then, is not that different ethical theories can be col-
lapsed into each other -- that REALLY, when one gets down to it, they 
are saying the same thing. For example, no matter how much one tries to 
integrate rule utilitarianism and rule deontology there will always be a 
difference in the starting points of their respective ethical reflec-
tions. Rule utilitarianism will consistently insist that the principle 
of utility justifies all other principles and rules, while the rule 
deontologist will argue that some principles and rules can be justified 
apart from the principle of utility (the principle of autonomy, say). 
And this theoretical difference between them does have immense impor-
tance for ethical judgment making. As Beauchamp and Childress continue: 
. . . we shall see throughout this volume that utilitarians tend to 
support a wide variety of types of research involving human subjects 
on grounds of social benefits of the research. Deontologists, by 
contrast, tend to be skeptical of much of this research on grounds 
of its actual or potential violation of the principles of autonomy 
and respect for persons.137 
What we are trying to argue, though, is that at times a utilitarian 
(act or rule) approach is more amenable to ethical judgment making (and 
in this sense offers proper characteristics of a moral judgment in this 
136Tom Beauchamp and 
Ethics, Second Edition. 
p. 41. 
137 Ibid., p. 41. 
James Childress, Princi les of Biomedical 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983 , 
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context), while at another time a deontological approach (act or rule) 
is preferable. And the only way to determine which to emphasize is to 
have an 11 integrated model 11 which includes both, among other possibili-
ties. 
Thus, we mention Beauchamp's attempted integrative theory as a 
backdrop (and philosophical justification) to our own. We will be using 
other terms than Beauchamp's, but our intent is the same as his, namely 
to develop an 11 integrated model 11 of moral judgment making. 
To set the stage, then, the first model which will be developed 
will be a teleological one. The summary of the ingredients of each 
ethical perspective will itself be integrated to a certain extent --
thus we will not quote extensive sources who adhered to these positions 
in one form or another. Some of that has been done previously; too much 
emphasis on sources at this point would be counterproductive, as we are 
attempting to establish a 11 gestalt 11 of a particular ethical theory and 
not a fully developed and argued for position. 
The teleological approach is one such attempt which seeks to 
interpret nature physical, human, social/political -- as exhibiting 
purposefulness. Various forms of development are inherently purposeful, 
for ethical judgment making is aimed at a specific end or result. Put 
differently, nature (or God) has a plan inherent in it which displays 
purposefulness. 
This does not imply, though, that the individual is always con-
scious of the goal or pattern; rather, it means that a rational person 
can discern a pattern or end to her ethical behavior -- she realizes 
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that a particular goal is inherent in her ethical judgment making, say. 
This purposefulness unites discreet acts into a pattern of meaning which 
helps the individual make appropriate moral judgments. In accomplishing 
this, teleological explanations are vehicles for answering 11 Why 11 ques-
tions. When asked why an individual judged 11 X11 to be ethically approp-
riate, a teleologist may respond by discussing the purposefulness of the 
action. Self-realization, for instance, is one such accomplishment when 
a person judges and acts in a purposeful manner. 
Aristotle points to this kind of case when he says that a doctor 
does not deliberate about whether to cure his patient: he takes the end 
for granted and asks how it may be achieved. 138 Of course, there is a 
difficulty with Aristotle's position. In cases of terminal illness, for 
instance, should the physician always act so as to cure the patient? 
Are there times when the physician should act to ensure the patient's 
death -- by withdrawing nourishment, say? 
Such questions do not have simple answers, and the teleological 
ethical position does not help in some ethical conflict situations, like 
the one just mentioned. This shows, again, that problems about the 
138Discussed in 
lems, Third Edition. 
78-104. 
Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy: History & Prob-
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983), pp. 
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starting point of moral reasoning encompass much uncertainty and con-
troversy, so that in itself any particular moral system leaves much to 
be desired. 
The following model suggests a teleological approach to ethical 
judgment making: 
Teleological Model 
a) Problem perception 
b) List of alternatives in light of specific goals 
c) For each alternative 
Assign a value or degree of completion to the goal 
achieved: 
1. +++ 
2. 
3. ++ 
4. 
5. Etc. 
d) Select the alternative(s) with the highest value for maximizing the 
goal. 
Take the concern with ethical policy making within a corporate en-
tity. The President of the corporation perceives that there are some 
serious moral issues that are in need of consideration. One alternative 
is to deal with the issues through Presidential fiat. Another is to 
form a Corporate Ethics Council to determine the telos of the corporate 
entity. Each alternative will produce some degree of satisfaction 
(probably). However, for the sake of argument, let us say the second 
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alternative is chosen because it is in keeping with the corporations 
goals, among other factors. In brief, this is but one description of 
the functioning of the Teleological Model. 
A second approach to ethical judgment making is sometimes termed 
deontology. Deontological ethics and formalism are somewhat related. 
To be consistent, we will use the term "formalist approach." This 
approach stresses one's duty, as opposed to teleology which emphasizes 
goal realization and consistency. Formalism is not a rejection of the 
teleological perspective, but it does have a different moral starting 
place and emphasis, as has been previously noted although the aim of 
the formalist is to do whatever is right even if it interferes with some 
goal or end. 
Formalists make moral judgments out of ethical principle. Accord-
ing to formalism, the rightness of an ethical judgment follows from 
principle and not from the consequences of the act. The formalist, 
thus, emphasizes the ethical actor's intention -- for a judgment is 
proper if an individual intends to do her duty which is based on moral 
principle. 
A formalist asks the following kinds of questions: 
necessary feature(s) of the ethical life? "What makes an 
"What is the 
ethical life 
possible?" The formalist insists that judging in conformity with ethi-
cal principle (doing one's duty) is the necessary feature of moral 
judgment making. 
Put a bit differently, formalism, especially of the Kantian brand, 
seems to have four sorts of arguments regarding the constituents ·of an 
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acceptable moral judgment (and of the good life). They are: 1) The 
insistence that the ideal life consists in submission to a certain will 
or command expressed in universal imperatives that hold for everyone and 
which admit of no exceptions; 2) the insistence that, unlike hypotheti-
cal imperatives, moral imperatives are unconditional, containing no 
exceptions, that is, binding regardless of the consequences and over-
riding all others with which they may come into conflict; 3) the 
argument that the will to which a morally good person submits is not the 
will of another, but her own will, insofar as she is rational; and 4) 
the stress on certain values, such as autonomy, dignity and self-
respect.139 A model of the formalist approach follows: 
Formalistic Model 
Problem perception 
List alternatives 
a. 
b. 
c. Compare 
List rules or principles 
a. 
b. 
c. 
139Philippa Foot brings this out well in "Morality as a System of 
Categorical Imperatives." Philosophical Review, 81 (1972), pp. 305-316. 
95 
One alternative consistent with rules 
One right action Several alternatives 
consistent with rules 
Several right actions 
Alternative 
consistent with 
one rule, con-
flicts with 
another 
Appeal to higher 
level rule to 
so 1 ve conflict 
A third approach to moral judgment making is a utilitarian model (a 
form of teleology). The utilitarian agrees with the teleologist that 
happiness is the appropriate end of ethical judgment. But she disagrees 
that there is a universal concept of happiness, such as human ration-
ality, say. Rather, most utilitarians (of the act or rule sort) develop 
a psychological theory of human happiness -- a life in which pleasure is 
emphasized over pain. This is based on the psychological truism that 
people usually seek pleasure and attempt to avoid pain. Thus, moral 
judgment making has a proper emphasis if moral act 11 X11 produces the 
greatest amount of happiness for people -- community benefit is impor-
tant here. Likewise, the happiness the utilitarian is concerned with is 
not sensual pleasure, but individual and community growth and develop-
ment. 
Against the formalists, for the utilitarian (of the act or rule 
sort) good intentions do not constitute a criterion for defining moral 
judgment; rather, like with Stephen Toulmin, the consequences of the act 
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have essential importance. One can imagine, for instance, a person who 
has the greatest of intentions, but whose judgment (and subsequent act) 
decreases human happiness. And, if the interests of individuals come 
into conflict, only those interests which further the community's gen-
eral happiness have ethical import. For example, fetal research and 
experimentation which could lead to better health care and prevention of 
disease among children would be morally justifiable because the conse-
quence is positive. The seeking of the general good is the meaning of 
moral judgment making for the utilitarian. 
Usually act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism are distin-
guished by ethicists. We have not done so in using utilitarian language 
in this Dissertation with complete consistency. Following our intent, 
we want to argue that there is a sense in which the distinction is not 
helpful and a sense in which it can be collapsed. 
Act-utilitarianism is the view that it is individual acts which are 
to be judged according to their utility, that is, the acts which ought 
to be done are those which yield the greatest utility. Rule utilitari-
anism (in its most common forms, at least) is the view that the act 
which ought to be done is that which is prescribed by the set of princi-
ples which has its highest "acceptance-utility," that is, those accepted 
in society will generally yield the greatest utility. 
Since, it is assumed, the general acceptance of a set of moral 
principles which includes most of the well-established ones would have 
better consequences than the acceptance of the principle that each 
individual act should be judged on grounds of its own utility without 
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bringing in any other principles, this would be a way of giving a 
rule-utilitarian justification for conforming to only well-established, 
accepted social principles. 
But, as G. E. Moore argued, this move to rule-utilitarianism is not 
necessary. He suggested that, given the pitfalls and uncertainties in 
moral judgment making (a point we have been hinting at throughout this 
Dissertation), a careful act-utilitarianism can argue that the probabil-
ity of acting for the best is maximized by sticking to the well-
established principles. 140 Such a philosophy will be both an act and a 
rule-utilitarian, so that the distinction between them collapses. 
The following model of ethical judgment making, then, is based on a 
utilitarian perspective: 
Utilitarian Model 
Problem perception 
List alternatives 
Make choice 
Frame an ethical statement 
a. Conditions 
b. Who 
c. What 
140G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica. 
University Press, 1966), p, 162. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge 
For each consequence 
Scan list of personal values 
Compare consequences with values 
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Examine this in light of the greatest good 
Make decision after possible consequences are decided 
A fourth approach to moral judgment making we will term personalism 
virtue. This is the most difficult to explain because it is composed of 
various strains of thought (which we cannot delve into here as this 
would take us too far afield from our present task). We need to stress 
the fact that the description of these various models is both tentative 
and oversimplistic. But their development is also for heuristic pur-
poses. 
The personalism-virtue model is concerned with individual moral 
growth. This approach can be traced to both Aristotle, who we mentioned 
when discussing virtue ethics, and Immanuel Kant's "Treat each person as 
an end in himself and not as a means." Thus, the personalism-virtue 
model is individually oriented; its basic concern is with moral judgment 
making at the individual level as it reflects community development. 
This approach includes five presuppositions. They are: 
1) Human beings are unique. This means that human persons are worth-
while because they are human persons; and they should be valued as 
such. 
2) Humans are virtuous beings, that is they have the 
usually the desire) to lead a life of virtue. 
capacity (and 
Put differently, 
following the lead of virtue ethics, proper moral judgment making is 
directly related to the virtue characteristics of the moral actor. 
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3) Humans are relational beings. We are called in the very depths of 
our being to be in relationship with others -- we cannot escape this 
fact, and such relationality defines us situationally as moral 
actors. 
4) A human is a unified person. This means that such philosophical 
separations as body/soul, mind/spirit/ and individual/community 
morality need to be questioned. 
5) A human is a transcendent being. We transcend ourselves merely 
through the act of using language (we go out of ourselves to others, 
that is). The Personalism-Virtue Model will now be expanded: 
Personalism-Virtue Model 
Problem perception 
List alternatives in light of the individual's characteristics: 
a. Uniqueness 
b. Virtuousness 
c. Relationality 
d. Unification 
e. Transcendence 
For each alternative a value should be assessed regarding its contribu-
tion to furthering a-e above. 
Select the alternative(s) which considers most fully the develop-
ment of a-e above. 
Moral judgment making which would flow from this approach would 
emphasize the virtue characteristics and positive qualities by which 
members of the community relate with one another. For instance, if the 
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issue were policy development within an institutional setting of some 
kind, such policies would acknowledge the full meaning of human person-
ness. They would seek to foster the individuals unique, virtue-
oriented, relational, unified and transcendent characteristics. 
Going into more depth regarding these various models is not needed, 
for we are not attempting to explicate or to philosophically analyze 
various ethical positions at this point in the Dissertation. The 
attempt is to reflect on the philosophical analysis already accomplished 
in order to develop a more comprehensive model of moral judgment making. 
Up to this point we have noted that there are different ways to philo-
sophically analyze moral judgment making -- and the attempt to examine 
the characteristics of moral judgments is a necessary aspect of this 
process, so it has been argued. 
The next move, then, will be to develop an "integrated model" of 
moral judgment making. But before such a model can be applicable, 
several steps needs to be taken. They include the following, and their 
inclusion depicts various elements from the other models developed in 
this chapter, as well as from the ethical theories explicated and philo-
sophically analyzed in this Dissertation: 
1) Goals need to be established which are made in light of the nature 
and purpose of whatever is under consideration. 
2) The goals should be prioritized, for they cannot all be achieved at 
the same time. The same value judgments involved in setting goals 
are generally present in setting priorities. 
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3) Individuals need to be aware of the precariousness of some ethical 
issues. As someone once said, 11 A problem to be a problem must BE a 
problem." Many minute, contradictory issues may be present to the 
moral agent. She needs to identify and prioritize these. 
4) If there is time, next comes the step of gathering data. Mere 
speculation cannot replace the gathering of data upon which to have 
a basis for moral judgment making (as much as Hare would disagree). 
5) Alternatives need to be devised and ethically evaluated. Of course 
this is not to suggest that all alternatives have the same moral 
weight. Rather, we are supposing that moral judgment making is (in 
part) a dialectical process. For instance, if life/death decisions 
were perfectly clear, there would be no need for moral judgment 
making. Best as we humans try, there seems to usually be an element 
of mystery and uncertainty involved in moral judgment making. 
6) The next step is to identify RELEVANT alternatives. Then each al-
ternative should be evaluated in light of the individual's goal(s). 
This is the content aspect of the process. Yet some alternatives 
can be eliminated due to a "limiting factor, 11 that is, it is 
necessary to realistically evaluate factors that limit certain 
alternatives: this may mean that some judgments can be eliminated 
because they are not realistic. 
7) After identifying all relevant alternatives, the next step is to 
examine and weigh the value of each alternative in terms of cate-
gorical ethical principles. This is the formalistic aspect of the 
model. 
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8) At this point it is necessary to ask two questions: "What is the 
short-term consequence (s) of the process? 1111 and, "What is the 
long-term consequence(s)? 11 Some alternatives can be disregarded 
because they are inappropriate. In sifting out the short and 
long-term consequence(s) of the process, an individual is using both 
a content criterion and the personalism-virtue model of moral 
judgment making. The next step is to compare and contrast the 
consequences. 
9) Next the individual should examine the short-term and long-term 
consequences in light of her goals. At times a short-term effect 
may have to be sacrificed because of its long-term consequence. 
10) At this stage the individual should be able to assess the best 
alternative in light of the following: 
a. Formalistic considerations 
b. An assessment of content aspects 
c. A realization of her virtue level 
d. Analysis of consequences of various sorts (a content aspect) 
e. The use of appropriate ethical principles (a formalistic 
emphasis). 
f. The development of personhood (a personalist-virtue ethics 
consideration) in relationship to community harmonization (a 
content aspect). 
The foll owing diagram is suggestive of such an 11 Integrated Model. 11 •. 
Integrated Model 
Problem perception List categorical ethical 
Identification of alternatives 
a. 
b. 
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principles 
a. 
b. 
c. Compare c. 
Evaluation of alternative(s) in light of purpose 
List consequences 
a. Immediate (short-range) 
b. Long-range 
For each consequence relating to the individual, the following need to 
be considered: 
a. The individual's uniqueness 
b. Virtue characteristics 
c. Relationality 
d. Unification 
e. Transcendence 
Again, compare consequences in light of goals 
Select the appropriate alternative 
What we are stressing, then, is that the various theories of moral 
judgment making and theories which proposed characteristics of moral 
judgments we have considered in this Dissertation need not be seen 
merely in isolation from one another. To do so is to view philosophy as 
a reductionist activity -- whereas integration has classically been one 
of philosophy's main functions. It is hoped that even if the details of 
the project of this Dissertation are somewhat unclear or inaccurate, 
that the theoretical arguments and analysis are well developed and 
argued. 
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Thus, to summarize: For one philosopher to appeal to utility and 
another to appeal to the principle of autonomy does make a great theo-
retical difference in their respective theories. But it may not make 
much difference at the level of moral judgments. Likewise, it may be 
impossible to have a TOTALLY adequate system of morality, that is, a 
system of morality which resolves every competing ethical claim -- after 
all moral principles and moral rules do conflict (beneficence and auton-
omy, for instance). Alan Donagan argues this point when he writes: 
In all the vast and imposing body of work on consequentialist moral 
theories, there are many sketches and projects for constructing 
moral systems. But none have been constructed.141 
This is not as odd as it may first appear: after all if different 
ethical theories initiate reflection from different standpoints, isn't 
141Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977), p. 191. 
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it logical that theory 11 X11 may leave out what theory 11 Y11 emphasizes? 
Beauchamp and Childress prefer to term ethical theories or systems 
"perspectives" to avoid this exact dilemma. They argue: 
It is quite possible that the moral life is so diverse that no 
theory can stand up to the completeness test even though a theory 
may capture some specific domain of that life, such as our con-
ception of 'justice' or our conception of 'the public interest.' 
Yet each of these broad ethical theories that we have examined 
arguably offer a valuable perspective from which to view moral-
ity .142 
This is precisely what we have been arguing here -- and precisely 
what philosophically justifies our attempt at an "integrated model." 
Let us, then, further explicate an "integrated model" by reference 
to Bernard Williams's concept of "integrity, 11143 for Williams's analysis 
of integrity will aid the argument for the necessity of an "integrated 
model." Put differently, thus far a critic might respond that the 
"integrated model" does not integrate anything. 
The contention of this Dissertation, then, is not merely a negative 
one: even though the three theories of what constitutes moral judgment 
making were found philosophically inadequate, it does not follow that 
nothing philosophically (and practically) interesting and important is 
part and parcel of the long philosophical tradition which has considered 
the nature of moral judgment making. Williams's notion of "integrity," 
then, will help us clarify why the "integrated model" integrates. 
142Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics, Second Edition, p. 43. 
143Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," The 
Identity of Persons, Ed. Amelle Rorty. (Berkeley: University ()f 
California Press, 1976), p. 201. 
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Williams argues that the 11 ground projects 11 in a person's life are 
what constitutes her character, that is, one's projects differentiate 
her from others. The 11 ground projects," those which constitute a per-
son's reason for being, are integral to one's identity. 144 And since 
integrity for Williams is tied to one's moral wholeness and is that 
virtue which unifies one's value system, a loss of integrity is tanta-
mount to a loss of one's moral identity, a loss of one's very moral 
self. 
Williams, then, is not merely arguing that one's 11 ground projects 11 
and commitments are integral to one's moral identity. He is noting that 
such concepts as universality and impartiality, and other formalist and 
utilitarian aspects of moral judgment making, precisely because they 
reject, or certainly de-emphasize, the importance of one's 11 ground 
projects 11 and commitments as a basis for the moral life, destroy the 
sense of what it means to be a moral being. 145 
To be a moral agent, according to this view, means, in part, to let 
one's "ground projects" and commitments take precedence over universal-
izing one's moral judgment, being impartial in one's mode of moral 
reasoning, or considering the consequences of one's moral judgment mak-
ing -- at least in many moral situations. Williams's view, obviously, 
has much in common with Kohlberg's at this point. Kohlberg's Stage 6 
144 Ibid., p. 201. 
145Bernard Williams, 11 Moral Luck," Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supp. Vol. 1 (1976), pp. 115-135. 
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individual makes moral judgments based on her "self-accepted moral prin-
ciples.11146 Williams, though, is saying something a little stronger, as 
he would apparently disagree with Kohlberg on the importance of univer-
sal principles of justice. 
What, though, is integrative about all this? Is not Williams pre-
cisely philosophically attacking both formalist and content theories of 
moral judgment making, leaving personal choice and dedication to indi-
vidual projects and commitments the hallmarks of a true moral judgment? 
It is not known how Williams would respond to the above interpretation 
of his philosophy of moral judgment making, but the argument will be 
extended to suggest that Williams' notion of integrity is integrative in 
the senses necessary for the "integrated model" to integrate: 1) It 
integrates the formalist, content and virtue ethics theories of moral 
judgment making; and, 2) it integrates moral judgment making with moral 
experience. 
1) For Williams to emphasize the importance of integrity based on 
one's acting out of "ground projects" and commitments is tantamount to 
him arguing that there is an integral relationship between one's moral 
character or virtue formation and moral judgment making. To violate 
one's integrity is to lose one's moral identity, even. It is integrity 
which binds together one's sense of being a moral self and one's process 
of moral judgment making. 
146Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement 
of the Platonic View," Moral Education, Ed. T. Sizer. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 58. 
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Williams's theory of moral judgment making has a content aspect, 
also. The concept of one's "ground project" is a non-moral concept, for 
instance. The justification for saying that 11 X11 is good in a moral 
sense is if 11 X11 is a satisfactory way of organizing one's moral life. 
Such a characteristic is, obviously, like 11 the moral point of view, 11 a 
content aspect of moral judgment making. 
Finally, Williams's theory has a formalist aspect to it, if by 
11 forma1 is t" is meant that there is a sense of mora 1 judgment making 
which includes a commitment to moral principles. Take the idea of moral 
obligation. What Williams seems to be saying is that if 11 X11 is the 
conventionally moral thing to do, and if one's integrity connotes that 
she would be unfaithful to her freely accepted 11 ground projects" and 
commitments if she judged that 11 X11 is the moral thing to do, her moral 
obligation, that which justifies both her moral life and her saying 11 X 
is the morally correct thing to do, 11 would transcend "the conventional 
thing to do." 
Put differently, as with Kohlberg, Williams is arguing that self-
accepted moral commitments form the basis of 11 proper 11 moral judgment 
making. These moral commitments, then, even if not universalizable, 
impartial and prescriptive, are formal principles and "ground projects" 
out of which one's moral judgment making operates. 
2) Williams' theory of moral judgment making is integrative in the 
sense that it ties together one's sense of being a moral self and moral 
experience. It has already been noted that integrity forms the basis of 
one's moral identity, and to violate that integrity is to precisely be 
alienated from one's moral ground of being. Yet Williams also says: 
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.projects, in a normally socialized individual, have in good 
part been formed within, and formed by dispositions which constitute 
a commitment to morality.147 
Williams moral universe, then, is not a throwback to the 11 do your 
own thing generation. 11 It is integrity which forms and unifies one's 
moral experience. Put another way, moral experience itself seems to 
have tied to it the concept of commitment. This is certainly the way 
Wallace, among others, have argued. Integrity, then, is the very inte-
gration of the concept of moral experience with one's sense of being a 
moral self. 
Williams' philosophical reflections on integrity, therefore, are 
one lens by which to view the 11 integrated model. 11 Without such a model 
one's moral experience may be forever out of touch with one's moral 
judgment making ability. One may, in all honesty and sincerity, attempt 
to consistently make impartial moral judgments, for example, without 
noticing that at times impartiality is violating her integrity that 
which makes her a moral self within a moral community. 
147Bernard Williams, 11 Persons, Character and Morality," p. 208. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We need to be clear about what is NOT being argued in this 
Dissertation. We are not saying that the various models of moral 
judgment-making are reducible to each other. It is not being implied 
that the models are insufficiently structured so as to never have any 
autonomous standing. All that is being argued (and this is a huge 
assertion from a philosophical standpoint) is a soft thesis that 
regarding some ethical issues deontology, say, is a better approach than 
teleology. But even this soft thesis is controversial. 
Then there is the strong thesis that an "integrated model" can 
serve the best of all possible worlds, that is, the "integrated model," 
since it includes the major ethical systems• input, can be of use in ANY 
ethical dilemma where judgment is necessary. By saying it can be of use 
does not mean that at certain times teleology, for instance, may be a 
better way to go. We are arguing, rather, that since the "integrated 
model" includes input from the various ethical perspectives and systems 
one can certainly emphasize the appropriate ethical perspective or 
system while admitting that other ethical perspectives or systems have 
RELEVANCE. 
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Following the lead of Robert Nozick let us help clarify the soft 
thesis further by centering in on deontology and teleology. And let us 
use Rawls' definition of the two, which Nozick uses. By deontology is 
meant an ethical stance which defines what is ethically appropriate 
independent of the good. By teleology is meant that ethical stance 
whereby appropriate ethical judgment and behavior is directed toward 
the achievement of a good, be it utilitarianism, consequentialism or any 
ethical theory which prescribes the content of appropriate moral 
judgment-making. 
Nozick states our soft thesis in the following manner: 
Peaceful coexistence in a division of labor. For one sort of 
problem or choice a deontological theory is correct, while for 
another, a teleological one is.148 
This proposition is not determining which situations are which. It is 
only a recognition that ethical judgment making situations have both 
deontological and teleological elements inherent in them, although 
certain issues which demand an emphasis of moral principle application 
may mean that a deontological theory is emphasized while those issues 
demanding a teleological principle application may mean that a 
teleological theory is emphasized. 
Our hard position can be further elucidated by Nozick's following 
remarks: 
148Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 494. 
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Another way to try to give each of deontology and teleology its due 
is ... by specifying different sources for each.149 
By "different sources 11 Nozick has in mind the foundations moral action, 
that is, the motivation for being moral in the first place. It can 
either come from an ethical pull, 11 a moral claim on us exerted by 
others, 11150 or an ethical push, the manner in which 11 ! am best off 
behaving. 11151 As he says: 
The deep and long-standing ethical conflict between deontology and 
teleology, each having strong intuitive force, would be neatly and 
satisfyingly explained if, for example, one view was the appropriate 
structuring of the ethical pull while the other was the appropriate 
structuring for the ethical push.152 
He puts this differently when he writes: 
Deontological concerns can thus be mirrored or presented naturally 
within a teleological framework concerned with maximizing the 
good.153 
What we are arguing by the development of the "integrated model 11 is that 
teleological concerns, likewise, can be mirrored or presented naturally 
within a deontological framework concerned with using and assessing 
moral principles. 
Perhaps agreement between teleologists and deontologists can more 
readily been seen at the level of moral principles or rules, that is, 
both ethical camps emphasize that moral judgment requires various 
149 Ibi d., p. 495. 
l50ibi d. , p. 451. 
151 Ibid., p. 495. 
152 Ibid., p. 495. 
153 Ibid., p. 498. 
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rules. 154 Without principles or rules of some sort, be it the principle 
of utility or that of autonomy, moral judgment-making would lose one of 
its main ingredients. And certainly it is the case that the type of 
principle or rule has serious implications for the actual ethical 
decision. If the principle is individual autonomy, such decisions as 
"informed suicide 11 make ethical sense. If the principle is that of 
personal or social utility, "informed suicide" might make different 
ethical sense. 
To agree that principles or rules are necessary for intelligent 
ethical judgment-making to occur, then, is not to assert much at the 
practical level. This agreement, though, is helpful at the theoretical 
level in noticing areas of common concern between teleology and 
deontology. And since, perhaps, the most interesting ethical issues are 
those in which there is an ethical conflict (between good vs. evil, good 
vs. good and evil vs. evil), there needs to be some model for making 
moral judgments. A simple teleological vs. ontological ethical universe 
won't do. Based upon such appeals, we submit the "integrated model. 11 
We have argued, then, that the three contenders for answering the 
question 11 What constitutes an ethical judgment? (formalism, the content 
approach and the virtue ethics perspective) are philosophically 
problematic. Our next move was to offer a soft position whereby it was 
recognized that for certain ethical judgments teleology offered a better 
154This point is developed 
Princi les of Biomedical Ethics, 
University Press, 1983 , p. 43. 
by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, 
Second Edition. (New York: Oxford 
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beginning; and for others deontology did the same. We noticed the 
incompleteness of the soft position and thus moved to argue for an 
"integrated model" of moral judgment making. The success of this 
endeavor is left to better minds to evaluate. 
It is the "integrated model" which attempts to explicate the 
various moral and non-moral, or utilitarian, structures through which 
individuals declare themselves to be moral judgment-makers. Such a 
model is a wholistic challenge to those who take their moral universe 
and their participation in a moral community seriously. 
In considering appropriate and relevant aspects of moral 
judgment-making, then, it is not enough to critique various 
philosophical traditions -- which creates a strong negative tone, 
perhaps, in the first few chapters of this Dissertation. Nor is it 
enough to argue that moral judgments, based on specific philosophical 
theories of moral judgment-making, are more appropriate in certain moral 
situations while not appropriate in others. 
This latter approach is preferable to a negative philosophical 
analysis which merely points out theoretical problems with specific 
philosophical theories of moral judgment-making. It is preferable 
because it does admit that moral philosophy has relevance for moral 
judgment-making. And, it is preferable because it can point to issues 
and areas of agreement -- as well as serve as a heuristic guide to moral 
judgment-making. 
But the development of an "integrated model" is crucial. It is 
crucial for at least two reasons: 1) Without such a philosophically 
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defensible model, theories of moral judgment-making become like a monad 
of Leibniz -- without any connection to anything else in moral theory or 
in moral experience. 2) An "integrated model" recognizes the person at 
the very heart of moral judgment-making, while also recognizing the 
importance of noting the relationship between moral principles to moral 
judgment-making, the need to realistically analyze the content aspects 
of such moral judgment-making and the utmost necessity of examining the 
moral characteristics of a moral judgment-maker. 
Put differently, moral principles are advocated by persons with 
specific moral commitments. Moral judgment-making is done by 
individuals who are conscious of "higher" ends, be they self-development 
or social happiness. The "integrated model , 11 then, is an attempt to be 
attentive to all of the above; and a future work is promised which will 
be solely devoted to philosophically fleshing out theoretical and prac-
tical aspects of the "integrated model" which are beyond the scope of 
this Dissertation. 
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